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TAYLOR VS. BLANCHETT
No. 11
Broker's Contract-Commission-Procuring Cause of Sale-Purchaser, Ready, Able
and Willing-Reserved Right to RevokeGood Faith-Revocation-Sale Completed
,by Principal-Construction of Contract.
1. Where, by the terms of a real estate
broker's contract, the principal agrees to
pay the broker a stipulated commission if
he sells certain real estate, or if he procures a purchaser, or if he assists in any
way to effect a sale, and such contract expressly reserves to the principal the right
at any time to withdraw- such land from
sale or exchange, if the broker procures a
customer, introduces him to the principal,
inspects the land and is negotiating for a
sale, and then the principal revokes the
agency and concludes the sale with such
customer without the aid of the broker, the
principal is liable for the stipulaed commission.
2. In this case the facts and circumstances sustain the inference that the principal did not act in good faith in revoking
the agency, but did so to avoid payment of
commission.
3. In procuring a customer and negotiating for a sale, the broker is the procuring cause, although the principal revokes
the agency and alone concludes the sale
with such customer.
4. The fact that the purchaser procured
by the broker was ready, able and willing
to buy, is conclusively established by the
fact that the principal concluded the sale
with such purchaser.
5. Where the contract specifies no time
limit for the broker's performance a reasonable time is implied. And where the
principal revokes the agency and effects a
sale with the purchaser procured by the
broker and with whom the broker has begun
negotiations, the principal cannot claim
that the contract was not performed within
a reasonable time.
6. Where the principal by the terms of
his contract agrees to pay the broker a
commission (1) if he sells the property, or
(2) if he finds a purchaser, or (3) if he
assists in any way to effect a sale, the
broker is entitled to the commission if he
performs any one of the considerations
enumerated.

Special assumpsit action in the
Notre Dame Circuit Court by Earnest M. Blanchett against Albert B.
Taylor. From a judgment for the
plaintiff the defendant appeals.

DAME

Affirmed.
Henry W. Fritz, Edmund J.
Meagher and George M. Witteried
for appellant.
William S. Allen, Frank Francescovich and Frank Coughlin, for
appellee.
VULPILLAT, J. The appellee,
Earnest M. Blanchett, brought action
in special assumpsit on a real estate
broker's contract to recover two hundred dollars commission alleged to
have been earned under that contract
on account of the sale of appellant's
farm. The second and third counts
of declaration upon which the case
was tried are founded upon the following written contract between the
parties:
"This agreement, made and entered into this first day of September,
1920, witnesseth, that Albert B. Taylor of St. Joseph County, Indiana,
has this day placed with Earnest M.
Blanchett of South Bend, Indiana, a
real estate agent, for sale or exchange the following described property (description) containing in all
two hundred acres.
"The said Taylor agrees to pay to
said Blanchett Ond Dollar per acre
of said real estate commission out of
the first funds received in payment
on account of such sale or on the exchange of said property in case a
purchaser is found, or said property
is sold or exchanged through said
Blanchett or through his influence,
or if he assists in any way in the sale
or exchange of said property.
"The said Albert B. Taylor reserves the right to withdraw said
property from sale or .exchange at
any time by giving ten days notice in
writing, and this agreement to re-
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main in full force until such notice is
given and expires.
"It is further agreed that if said
Albert B. Taylor shall secure a purchaser without the aid or assistance
of said Earnest M. Blanchett, while
the property is still in his hands
under this contract, said Blanchett is
not to receive any compensation for
his services rendered. (Signed)
"Albert B. Taylor,
"Earnest M. Blanchett."
To the declaration, the appellant,
Taylor, filed plea in two counts: the
general issue traverse, and a confession and avoidance plea avering that
the defendant, in accordance with his
contract, terminated the agency in
good faith, serving the plaintiff with
written notice of revocation for ten
days, and thereafter, without the aid
of plaintiff, himself disposed of his
farm. Upon these issues the case
was submitted to the court for trial,
a jury being waived. The court found
for the plaintiff and rendered judgment accordingly. A motion for a
new trial was overruled and this appeal perfected.
The errors assigned for reversal of
the judgment are the overruling of
the motion for a new trial; that the
judgment is contrary to the evidence,
is not supported by sufficient evidence, and is contrary to law. The
court is not disposed to consider the
assigned errors based on the evidence. The trial court considered
the evidence in arriving at the finding, and again considered the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain
that finding when ruling on the motion for a new trial. It is not the
province of the appellate court to consider the evidence de novo with a
view to substituting its finding for
that of the trial court. And it is only
upon a clear showing that the evi-

dence is contrary to the finding or
that it is insufficient to support it
that an appellate court would be warranted in disturbing the trial court's
finding or the jury's verdict. DuffPioneer Stock Powder Co. vs. Koontz,
Notre Dame Law Reporter, Nov.,
1920, pg. 2. Furthermore, the appellant does not sufficiently set forth
and discuss in his brief the record
evidence to present the errors assigned thereon, and these assignments must therefore be regarded as
waived under the rule of court.
The theory upon which the appellant seeks to prevail on this appeal
is that set out in his confession and
avoidance plea, namely: that because
appellee had not effected a sale of
the real estate before appellant in
good faith exercised his stipulated
right to terminate the agency, appellee is entitled to no commission.
This involves two propositions: (1)
that appellant acted in good faith in
revoking appellee's agency, and (2)
that appellee had not earned his commission under his contract beyond
the power of the appellant by good
faith revocation to avoid liability
.therefor.
The general power of the principal
at any time to revoke his agent's
authority is, not quvstioned. The
principal has the right to revoke the
agency at any timne before the broker
finds a customer ready, able and willing to buy upon the principal's
terms. Young vs. Trainor, 158 Ill.
428-42 N. E. 139; Provident Trust
Co. vs. Darrough, 168 Ind. 29-78 N.
E. 1030; Benton vs. Brown, 145 Iowa
604-124 N. W. 815; West vs. Demme,
128 Mich. 11-87 N. W. 95; Donovan
vs. Weed, 182 N. Y. 43-74 N. E. 563
And a broker is not ordinarily entitled to a commission for a sale made
by the principal after the principal
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has in good faith revoked the agency,
even if the sale be to the very person
with whom the broker has been negotiating. Sibbald vs. Bethlehem
Iron Co., 83 N. Y. 378-38 Am. Rep.
441; Alden vs. Erl, 121 N. Y. 688-24
N. E. 705; Neal vs. Lehman, 11 Tex.
C. A. 461-34 S. W. 153; Earnest vs.
Cahill, 166 Cal. 493-137 Pac. 256;
Blogett vs Sioux City R. Co., 63 Iowa
606-19 N. W. 799; Stedman vs. Richardson, 100 Ky. 79-37 S. W. 259;
Staehlin vs. Kramer, 118 Mo. App.
329-94 S. W. 785. But the principal,
in revoking such agency, must act in
good faith and not merely for the
purpose of avoiding liability to the
broker for commission. Uphoff vs.
Ulrich, 2 Ill. App. 399; O'Connell vs.
Casey, 206 Mass. 520-92 N. E. 804;
Friedenwald vs. Welch, 174 Mich.
399-140. N. W. 564; Bowe vs. Cage,
132 Wis. 441-112 N. W. 469-12 L.
R. A. (NS) 265; White vs. Hollman,
(Texas C. A.) 180 S. W. 286; Branch
vs. Moore, 84 Ark. 462-105 S. W.
1178-120 Am. St. Rep. 78.
The proposition that appellant acted in good faith in revoking
appellee's agency, and not merely to
avoid payment of commission, presents an issue of fact which was determined adversely to appellant by
the trial court. But appellant earnestly maintains that there is no
evidence of bad faith in the record,
and that his own testimony establishes his good faith. In such cases as
this the fact of good or bad faith of
the principal in revoking the agency
must be determined almost wholly by
inference from the facts and circumstances proven in the case., The facts
of appellant's case tend strongly to
sustain the inference that appellant's
revocation of appellee's agency was
not made in good faith but was made
to avoid payment of commission to

appellee under the contract. Courts
have sustained such inference upon
fewer facts than appear in appellant's
case. In Cadigan vs. Crabtree, 179
Mass 474-61 N. E. 37-88 Am. St.
Rep. 397-55 L. R. A. 77, the court
said: "It perhaps might be assumed
that a broker's authority is revoked
in bad faith where negotiations had
been carried on by the broker for his
principal and had progressed so far
that he was found to be the efficient
cause in fact (as in appellant's case)
of a trade subsequently struck between the principal and customr." To
the same effect is the decision of the
court in the case of Dodge vs. Childers, 167 Mo. App. 448-151 S. W. 749.
Appellant testified that the purchaser, procured by the appellee and
with whom the appellee had negotiated the terms of sale upon which appellant, after revoking the agency,
closed the deal, had refused to conclude such sale through the appellee
as agent. This could furnish no legal
excuse for revocation of the agency
and avoidance of liability for commission under the contract.
In a
similar cas'e the Texas Civil Court of
Appeals declared that bad faith or
intent of the principal to defeat the
broker's right to ' commission may
be inferred from the fact that the
parties took the matter up directly
with each other, when both lWew
the efforts of the broker to effect a
sale, and from the further fact that
the purchaser had previously made
an effort to eliminate the broker.
Anderson vs. Crow, 151 S. W. 1080.
We cannot disturb the finding of the
trial court on the issue of appellant's
alleged good faith revocation of appellee's agency.
Even if it were conceded that appellant acted in good faith in revoking the agency, we are of opinion
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that appellee's commission had been
earned under his contract so as to be
wholly unaffected by such revocation.
To have avoided liability for commission appellant must not only have
acted in good faith in the revocation
of appellee's agency but he must
have notified appellee of such revocation before he had performed his
contract.
Bash vs. Hill, 62 Ill.
216; Stiewell vs. Lally, 89 Ark. 195115 S. W. 1134; Clements vs. Stapleton, 136 Iowa 137-113 N. W. 546.
Where the principal terminates the
agency after the broker has found a
person ready, able and willing to buy
on terms acceptable to the principal,
the broker is entitled to his commission, especially where the principal
subsequently sells the property to
such person. Weisels-Gerhart Real
Estate Co., vs. Epstein, 157 Mo. App.
101-137 S. W. 326; New Kanawaha
Coal Co., vs. Wright, 163 Ind. 529-72
N. E. 550; Reishus-Reme Land Co.
vs. Berner, 91 Minn. 401-98 N. W.
186; Day vs. Porter, 161 Ill. 235-43
N. E. 1073; Birdsell vs. Fraenzel, 154
Wis. 48-142 N. W. 274; Smith vs.
Plant, 216 Mass. 91-103 N. E. 58;
McGovern vs. Bennett, 146 Mich. 558109 N. W. 1055; Maddox vs. Harding, 91 Nebr. 292-135 N. W. 1019.
In general there are three different
methods for earning a commission as
a real estate broker: (1) by effecting
a binding contract of sale for the
principal under authority to the
broker to make a sale; (2) by producing a purchaser to whom a sale
is in fact made; (3) by producing a
purchaser ready, able and willing to
buy on terms specified in the broker's contract or acceptable to the
principal. McDermott vs. Mahony,
129 Iowa, 292-115 N. W. 32-116N. W.
788: Godfrey vs. Weisner, 169 Cal.
667-147 Pac. 952. In appellant's

case the appellee procured the purchaser to whom appellant sold his
farm. Appellee was the procuring
cause of the sale, notwithstanding
the appellant concluded the transaction himself without the further aid
of appellee. A broker may be the
procuring cause of the sale whether
he concludes the transaction in the
principal's behalf or the principal
does so himself. Doran vs. Bussard,
18 N. N. App. 36-45 N. Y. Sup. 387;
Loud vs. Hall, 106 Mass. 404; Lewis
vs. NcDonald, 83 Nebr. 694-120 N.
W. 207; Jennings vs. Trummer, 52
Oreg. 149-96 Pac. 874-132 Am. St.
Rep. 680-23 L. R. A. (NS) 164.
"Where the parties are brought together as a result of the broker's efforts, and a sale, lease or exchange
results, the broker becomes entitled
to a commission, although he is not
present during the negotiations following the introduction or takes no
part therein." 9 Corpus Juris 615,
Sec. 97, note 25; Tucker vs. Hawley,
23 Cal. A. 460-138 Pac. 358; TonkinClark Realty Co. vs. Hedges, 24 Idaho 304-133 Pac. 669, Henry vs. Stewart, 185 Ill. 448-57 N. E. 190; Hafner vs. Herron, 165 Ill. 242-46 N. E.
211; Gouge vs. Hoyt, 127 Iowa 340101 N. W. 463; Douville vs. Comstock, 110 Mich. 693-69 N. W. 79;
Willard vs. Wright, 203 Mass. 406-89
N. E. 559; Burdon vs. Briquelet, 125
Wis. 341-104 N. W. 83; Wolverton vs.
Tuttle, 51 Oreg. 501-94 Pac. 961.
That the purchaser procured by
the appellee was ready, able and willing to buy is conclusively established by the fact that he actually bought
upon terms negotiated by appellee
and accepted by appellant. Coffman
vs. Dyas Realty Co. 176 Mo. App.
692-159 S. W. 842; Handley vs. Shafer, 177 Ala. 636-59 So. 286; Ketcham
vs. Alexander, 160 Iowa 455-142 N.
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W. 62: Hutchinson vs Plant, 218
Mass. 148-105 N.E. 1017; Schlegel vs.
Fuller, (Okla.) 149 Pac. 1118. Where
such sale is concluded by the principal or upon report by the brokertothe
principal is confirmed, it is not necessary to prove that the purchaser was
ready, able and willing to buy. Kolp
vs. Brazer, (Tex. Civ. A.) 161 S. W.
899; Stoutenburg vs Evans, 142
Iowa 239-120 N. W. 59.
If it be a fact that the purchaser
was unwilling to conclude the sale
through the appellee, this is no evidence of unwillingndss to purchase
appellant's land. That the purchaser procured by appellee was willing
to purchase the land is clearly established by the evidence that he accompanied appellee to the appellant's
farm and with him made an inspection thereof with a view to purchasing; that he was introduced to appellant by appellee; that he entered
into negotiations with the appellee
and virtually agreed to the terms of
purchase upon which appellant himself subsequently effected the sale.
Unwillingness of the purchaser in
this case, if any, went to the matter
of concluding the sale through the appellee and not at all to the matter of
purchasing appellant's farm. But
this is not the element of willingness
that, in contemplation of law, makes
a principal liable to a broker who
procures a purchaser, ready, able
and willing to buy. Neither the principal nor the customer can break off
negotiations and defeat the broker's
right to a commission by concluding
the transaction without his aid, after the broker has found a customer
and begun negotiations under his
contract, 9 Corpus Juris 619, See. 99;
Church vs. Dunham, 14 Idaho 77696 Pac. 203; Rigdon vs. Move, 226
Ill. 382-80 N. E. 901; Gibson vs.

Hunt, (Iowa) 94 N. W. 277; Treacy
vs. Gilman, 161 Ky. 513-171 S. W.
153; Malcoon vs Barrett, 192 Mass.
552-78 N. E. 560; Hubbard vs. Leiter, 145 Mich. 387-108 N. W. 735.
The case of Fultz vs. Weimer, 34
Kan. 576-9 Pac. 316, cited and stressed by appellant, gives no support
whatever to appellant's case. The
following decisions of the Supreme
Court of Kansas sustain the right of
the appellee to recover commission
from appellant under their contract:
Morros vs. Francis, 75 Kan. '58-16
Am. St. Rep. 512; Stephens vs. Scott,
43 Kan. 285-23 Pac. 555; Putnam vs.
King, 96 Kan. 109-150 Pac. 559;
Beaugher vs. Clark, 81 Kan. 250-106
Pac. 39-27 L. R. A. (NS) 198. The
Fultz vs. Weimer decision merely
supports the proposition that where
the parties stipulate that an agency
to sell real estate is limited to a definite period, the contract terminates
at the expiration of that time, leaving
the principal free to negotiate a sale
to anyone, even to the person with
whom the broker negotiated. This is
for the reason that the broker contracted to sell the land, and to do so
in sixty days. He did neither and his
contract terminated by its own
terms. In appellant's case appellee
did not contract to sell the land for
his commission, nor does the contract
specify any limit of time within
which performance must be made. In
such case a reasonable time is implied. Geiger vs. Keiser, 47 Colo.
297-107 Pac. 267; Harris vs. Moore,
134 Iowa, 704-112 N. W. 164. In the
case of Burd vs. Webster 128 Wis.
118-107 N. W. 23, a delay of four
months was held reasonable. Where
the broker finds a purchaser and is
negotiating with him for a sale, and
the principal himself completes the
transaction, such principal cannot
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claim that the sale was not negotiated within a reasonable time. Morgan vs. Keller, 194 Mo. 663-92 S. W.
75; Moore vs. Boehm, 45 Misc. 62291 N. Y. Sup. 125.
In the Fultz vs. Weimer case the
principal contracted to pay a commission upon the sole consideration
that the broker sell the real estate;
the appellant, however, by the express terms of his contract agrees to
pay appellee the stipulated commission upon any one of three considerations, (1) the sale or exchange of
thd property, (2) for finding a purchaser, and (3) for assisting in any
way to effect a sale or exchange. Both
the second and third considerations
were furnished before appellant attempted to revoke the agency, and, as
we have seen, appellee is entitled to
credit for the sale negotiated by him
but completed by appellant himself.
If appellee did any one of the things
he contracted to do he is entitled to
his commission. Walker Mfg. Co.,
vs. Knox, 136 Fed. 334; Sill vs.
Caschi, 167 Cal. 698-140 Pac. 949;
Bartow vs. Parsons Pulp Co. 208
Mass. 232-94 N. E. 312. And the revocation of his agency did not affect
his right to recover for the services
rendered in the transaction ultimately completed by appellant. Smith vs.
Anderson, 2 Idaho 537-21 Pac. 4121;
Martin vs. Holly, 104 N. C. 36-10 S.
E. 83; New Kanawha Coal Co. vs
Wright, 163 Ind. 529-72 N. E. 550;
Mechem on Agency, 63.
The contract in appellant's case as
firmly establishes his liability to pay
the appellee the commission which
he earned, as did the contract in the
Fultz vs. Weimer case exhonorate the
principal from liability for commission which the broker did not earn.
The principle of that case is that
where the contract by its express

terms determines the rights and liabilities of the contracting parties,
such contract is conclusive upon both
principal and broker; and that principle must be applied against appellant in this case. Appellant's contract is impossible of such a construction as would enable him to defeat
appellee's right to a commission upon
the mere arbitrary exercise of appellant's reserved right to revoke the
agency at any time.
The trial court's finding is fully
sustained by the evidence and is in
complete accord with" the law; and
this sustaines the ruling of the court
on the motion for a new trial. Finding no error in the record, the lower
court's judgment is in all things affirmed.
DAVENPORT* vs. REILLY
No. 12
Tort-Negligence--Civil Action for Damages-Violation of City Ordinanceas Contributory Negligence-Efficient Cause or
Condition-Proximate Cause - Instruction
Construed and Sustained.

1. Although R. parks his limousine at
the street curb in violation of the city ordinance, he is entitled to recover the damages
caused by the negligence of D. in driving

his car into the limousine, unless the parking of the limousine actually contributes as
a proximate cause to effect the damage.

2. If the conduct or omission constituting a violation of a statute or ordinance is
part of the res gestae or transaction complained of, such conduct or omission is negligence per se, as a matter of law, and the
court should so instruct the jury.
3.

Negligent acts amounting to a viola-

tion of a city ordinance held to be a mere
condition and not an efficient or proximate
cause for the damage, and therefore not
constituting contributory negligence in bar
of plaintiff's right of action.
Civil action for damages to plaintiff's limousine on account of the alleged willful and negligent conduct of
defendant. From a judgment for
plaintiff defendant appeals.
Afflirrized.
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John J. Buckley and Franklyn E.
Miller or appellant.
Bernard Vincent Pater and Aaron
H. ttuguenard for appellee.
VUR.PILLAT, J. This is a civil
action in which the plaintiff recovered a judgment against the defendant
for $650 damages alleged to have
sustained through the negligent and
willful conduct of the plaintiff ai
driving his automobile into the limousine of the plaintiff while said limousine was parked at the curbing in
Michigan Street in the city of South
Bend, Indiana. Plaintiff's complaint
is in two paragraphs; the first based
on the theory that the damage was
caused by the defendant in carelessly and negligently operating and
driving his automobile at and against
the limousine of the plaintiff while
such limousine was parked in the
street named, and without the fault
or negligence of plaintiff; the
second paragraph alleges that the
fendant wantonly and willfully drove
his car into the limousine of plaintiff.
The defendant answered in general
denial to each of these paragraphs of
complaint, and upon the issues so
formed the case was submitted to a
jury for trial. The jury returned a
verdict for the plaintiff in the sum
of $650. Motion for new trial on the
alleged ground of erroneous instructions and that the verdict is contrary
to the law and the evidence was overruled. Judgment was then entered
on the verdict and this appeal taken.
Appellant assigns as error the overruling of the motion for a new
trial, and that the verdict and judgment are contrary to the law and the
evidence. As a reason why a new
trial should be granted it is contended that the court's instruction number nine, given to the jury of the
court's own motion, is erroneous.

The instructions are properly in the
record and the particular instruction
complained of is as follows:
"It has been admitted that at the
time of the collision complained of
the plaintiff's limousine was parked
in violation of a city ordinance of the
City of South Bend. The defendant
contends that this constitutes contributory negligence on the part of
the plaintiff which precludes recovery. Upon this issue the court instructs you that, if you find it to be a
fact that the plaintiff's limousine
was actually parked in violation of
the city ordinance, this would in law
constitute negligence per se., but the
court instructs you that that fact
alone does not constitute contributory
negligence and bar plaintiff's right to
recover for the damages caused proximately by the negligence of the defendant, if such is found, but, notwithstanding such unlawful parking
of the car, it still would remain for
the jury to determine from a preponderance of the evidence whether
such negligent parking of the car
also proximately contributed to cause
the damages alleged. And in determining whcther such negligent parking of plaintiff's car was a contributing proximate cause with that of defendant's alleged negligence, you
should apply the rule already stated
as to what is proximate cause for injury or damage. Was the alleged illegal parking of plaintiff's car, in itself, an efficient cause for the collision, actually causing or contributing to cause proximately the damage
complained of; or was it a mere condition not capable of being an efficient
cause, or not necessarily nor proximately contributing as a cause to
produce the damage alleged to be
due solely to the negligence of the defendant. If the illegal parking of the
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car was a mere condition, or if it was
not a proximate cause, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff, notwithstanding such illegal parking of
the car, providing you find that the
damage was due to the defendant's
negligence as alleged. If you should
find that the car as illegally parked
did in fact contribute as a proximate
cause to produce the damage complained of, then your verdict should
be for the defendant."
It is well settled as an abstract
proposition of law that the violation
of a city ordinance, no less than of a
statute, may constitute negligence
per se, or as a matter of law. Butz vs.
Cavanaugh, 137 Mo. 503-38 S. W.
1104-59 Am. St. Rep. 504; Smith vs.
Milwaukee Bldrs' Exch., 91 Wis. 36064 N. W. 1041-51 Am. St. Rep. 91230 L. R. A. 504; Louisville etc. R. Co.,
vs. Davis, 7 Ind. App. 222-33 N. E.
451; Wabash R. Co. vs. Kamradt, 109
Ill. App. 203. And the violation of a
city ordinance by the injured party
may constitute contributory negligence in bar of recovery. Boshart
vs. Little, 59 Conn. 1-21 Atl. 925-11
L. R. A. 33; Weller vs. Chicago etc.
R. Co., 120 Mo. 635-23 S.W. 1061-26
S. W. 532. It must appear, however,
that the acts or omissions which constitute a violation of the ordinance
are part of the res gestae or transaction of the case, that is, enter into
the negligence or contributory negligence alleged to have caused the damage. Ubelman vs. American Ice Co.,
209 Pa. St. 398-58 Atl. 849. In this
case the parking of plaintiff's limousine is alleged not only to have been
in violation of the city ordinance but
also to have constituted such negligence as contributed proximately to
cause the damage sustained. It was
therefore the duty of the court to instruct the jury, as was done, that

plaintiff's parking of his limousine, if
found to be inviolation of the city
ordinance, was negligence per se.
Lloyd vs. Pugh, 158 Wis. 441, 149 N.
W. 150; Smith vs. M. B. & T. E., 91
Wis., 360, 64 N. W. 1041, 30 L. R. A.
504, 51 A. M. St. Rep. 912.
But, as stated by the court in the
instruction, the fact of parking the
car at the street curb in such manner
as to be in violation of the city ordinance, and per se negligence on the
part of the plaintiff, was not sufficient of itself to consitute contributory negligence in bar of plaintiff's
right of recovery, for, notwithstanding such negligent and unlawful
parking of the car, it still would remain for the jury to determine from
a preponderance of the evidence that
such negligent parking of the car
proximately contributed to cause the
damage. Steele vs. Burkhardt, 104
Mass. 59, 6 Am. Rep. 191, where a
wagon parked in violation of an ordinance held not proximate cause;
Railroad Co. vs. Buck, 116 Ind. 566,
19 N. E. 453; Tacket vs. Taylor, 123
Iowa 149, 98 N. W. 730; Southwick
vs. Hall, etc. Co., 59 Conn. 261, 21
At!. 924, 21 Am. St. Rep. 104, 12 L.
R. A. 279; Flynn vs. San Francisco
R. Co., 40 Cal. 14, 6 Am. Rep. 695.
The court further instructed the
jury that, in determining whether
the negligent parking of plaintiff's
'car was a conributing proximate
cause with that of defendant's alleged
negligence, they should apply the
rule already stated as to what was
proximate cause as applied to defendant's negligence. This rule was correctly stated in the instruction referred to. Indeed, no complaint is made
of such insruction. In applying the
same test to both parties for determining whether the negligence of each
was a proximate or remote cause of
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the damage, the trial court committed no error. As said in one case
"plaintiff's
(contributory)
negligence must be the proximate cause
in the same sense in which the defendant's negligence must have been
a proximate cause in order to give
him a right of action." Rider vs.
Syracuse Rapid Tr. Co., 171 N. Y.
139, 63 N. E. 836, 58 L. R. A. 125;
Boyce vs. Wilbur Lmbr. Co., 119
Wis 642, 97 N. W. 563.
The instruction was also correct in
directing the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff, if they found
the alleged illegal parking of plaintiff's limousine was in itself a mere
condition and not capable of being an
efficient cause, or not contributing
proximately to causu the damage,
providing they found such damage
to be due solely to the defendant's alleged negligence; but that the verdict should be for the defendant if
the jury should find that the plaintiff's limousine as illegally parked
did contribute as a proximate cause
to the alleged damage. No injured
party may recover damages where
his own illegal or wrongful act is necessarily involved in the proof of his
own case; such, for instance, as a
plaintiff's own trespass or contributory negligence. Oates vs. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 168 Mo. 535, 68 S. W.
906, 58 L. R. A. 447; *Bittner vs.
Tract. Co., 23 Ohio Cir. Ct. (NS.)
604; Evansville etc. R. Co. vs. Duncan, 28 Ind. 441, 92 Am. Dec. 322;
Rasper vs. Kopp, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 2342
73 S. W. 1127; Lehigh Valley R. Co.
vs. Greiner, 113 Pa. St. 600, 6 Atl.
246. On the other hand, if plaintiff's
wrongful or illegal act does not enter
into the proof of his case he may recover. Schultz vs. Paul, N. D. Law
Rep., Apr. 1920, pg. 10; Cranford
vs. Dressler, N. D. Law Rep. Apr.

1921. pg. 2.
Whether or not the illegal parking
of plaintiff's limousine contributed
proximately to cause the damage of
which plaintiff complained, was a
question of fact for the jury to determine. See Milwaukee & St. P.
Ry. Co. vs. Kellog, 94 U. S. 469, 24
Law Ed. 256; Schumacher vs. St. P.
etc. R. Co., 46 Minn. 39. 48 N. W.
559, 12 L. R. A. 257. And we cannot
disturb the verdict og the jury on
this issue of fcat. The trial court
refused to do so upon consideration
of the moion for a new trial, and the
trial court is much better qualified to
pass upon issues of fact determined
onthetrial thanis the appellate court.
The insruction complained of is
not erroneous in any particular. The
verdict is amply supported by the evidence in the record, and the motion
for a new trial was therefore properly overruled. We may say, how'ever that we have examined the record particularly with reference to
the evidence that might tend to sustain the appellant's contention that
'plaintiff's negligent and illegal parking of his limousine was a contributing proximate cause of the damage
sustained. There is little evidence
of the condition of the street at the
point where the collision occurred
as to its width, narrow or cramped
condition, heavy and continuous
street car service and general traffic,
particularly at the time of the collision, which would operate concurrently with the parked condition of
plaintiff's limousine so as to make
such negligence of the plaintiff a
proximate cause with the negligence
of the defendant to occasion the damage sustained.
The verdict and judgment are not
contrary to law; there is no error in
the record. Judgment is affirmed.
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BRIEF OF HENRY W. FRITZ IN CASE OF
TAYLOR vs. BLANCHETT.
In the Supreme Court of Notre Dame
Albert B. Taylor, Appellant
VS.
Earnest M. Blanchett, Appellee
NATURE OF ACTION.
This is an appeal brought by Albert B. Taylor against the appellee,
Earnest M. Blanchett, from a judgment rendered in favor of the appellee, in the Notre Dame Circuit
Court. The appellee as plaintiff, a
broker employed by
defendant,
brought action in special assumpsit to
recover from Taylor a commission
which he claimed he was entitled to
for the sale of a certain tract of land
owned by Taylor and sold to one
Hardesty. The court entered judgment in the sum of two hundred dollars, ($200) principle and interest, in
favor of the plaintiff and against the
the defendant from which judgment
the defendant prosecutes his appeal
to this court.
WHAT THE ISSUES WERE
The issues formed consisted of a
declaration in three counts. The defendant filed a general demurrer to
the first count which was sustained,
and the plaintiff went to trial on the
last two counts of his declaration.
The defendant filed an amended
plea consisting of two counts: (1)
general issue (2) confession and
avoidance alleging that the defendant in accordance with the terms of
the contract terminated the agency
in good faith, serving the plaintiff
with a written notice of the discontinuance of the agency. The trial
was had, both parties waiving the
right to a trial by jury.
The defendants filed a motion for
a new trial on the following

grounds: (1) The finding is contrary
to the law; (2) The finding is contrary to the evidence.
Errors relied on for reversal: (1)
The judgment is contrary to law.
(2) The judgment is contrary to evidence. (3) The judgment appealed
from is not supported by sufficient
evidence.
(4) The court erred in
overruling the appellant's motion for
a new trial.
CONDENSED STATEMENT
THE EVIDENCE

OF

The attorneys for Blanchett by the
evidence introduced relied wholly upon the fact that their client introduced the purchaser to Taylor and that
he was the procuring cause of the
sale which was made by Taylor. The
plaintiffs first exhibit consisted of
the following: (Contract of parties.
See Courts opinion ante.)
The second exhibit introduced into evidence by the plaintiff consisted
of a notice of revocation sent to Blanchett by Taylor revoking his agency
dated Sept. 30, 1920. By additional
evidence the date of the sale of the
land by Taylor to Hardesty was established, namely, October 15, 1920,
this being fifteen days after the date
that the notice of revocation was delivered to Blanchett.
A. B. Taylor's testimony showed
that he was desirous to have the
plaintiff effect a sale and that he revoked the agency only when he was
convinced that Blanchett would not
be able to close the deal. The plaintiffs made no effort and in fact did
not show, either by cross examination or by any direct evidence, that
Taylor acted in bad faith or revoked
the agency merely to defeat Blan-
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chett in the collection of his commission.
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
1. The terms of a contract must
govern and courts can only enforce
'contracts as the parties themselves
made them. Fultz vs. Wimer, 9 Pac.
316. Bacon vs. Cobb, 45 Ill. 47.
2. The broker cannot claim commissions upon a subsequent sale
made by his principal, even to the
identical individual introduced by
him if he cannot show that he
brought the parties to an agreement.
Ropes vs. John Rosenfelds Sons, 79
Pac. 354. Hay vs. Platt 66 Hun. 488.
Baker vs. Thomas, 12 Misc. 432.
Gaty vs. Foster, 18 Mo. App. 639.
Ames vs. McNally, 6 Misc. 93. Wylie vs. Maine Nat'l. Bank, 61 N. Y.
416.
3. One broker who is unsuccessful in effecting a sale does not become entitled to a commission upon
the success of another. Ward vs.
Fletcher, 124 Mass. 224. Crook et al
vs. Forest et al. 116 Ala. 375.
A man's authority to a broker to
sell his property or to find him a purchaser is revokable at any time. Donovan vs. Weed, 182 N. Y. 43-74 N. E.
563. Chambers vs. Seay, 73 Ala. 372.
Coffin vs. Landis, 46 Pa. 426. Gardner vs. Pierce, 116 N. Y. Supp. 155.
5. A lack of good faith must be
shown on part of principal in the evidence to prevent him from revoking
the agency. Neal vs. Lehman, 34 S.
W. 153. Fultz vs. Wimer, 9 Pac. 316.
Sibbald vs. Bethlehem Iron Co. 38
Am. Rep. 441.
6. The duty of a broker consists
in bringing the minds of the vendor
and vendee to an agreement. Barnard vs. Monnot, 34 Barb. 90. Pott
Vs. Turner, 6 Bing. 702.
7. A broker earns his commissions
by making a sale on the terms fixed

by the principal while his authority
continues. Satterthwaite vs. Vreeland, 3 Hun. 152.
8. A procuring cause, as used in
the sense of a real estate broker procuring for a client a purchaser,
means the original discovery of the
purchaser by the broker, and the
starting of the negotiations by him,
together with the final closing by or
on behalf of his client with the purchaser through the efforts of the
Cause"
broker. See "Procuring
Words and Phrases. Ware vs. Don
Passos, 38 N. Y. Supp. 673.
ARGUMENT
The appellant believes that no
more satisfactory general rule can
be laid down than to ascertain: (1)
What did the broker undertake to
do? (2) Has he completed that undertaking within the time and upon
(3) If not,
the terms stipulated?
is the default attributable to his own
act or to the interference of the principal.
The plaintiff in this case, under
the terms of a written contract,
agreed to procure a purchaser for
By a
the lands of the defendant.
is
law
of
brokerage
purchaser in the
meant one who is ready, willing and
able to buy. Fultz vs Wimer, 9 Pac.
316. Dowling vs. Morrill, 165 Mass.
491. The above two cases are cited
for the purpose of establishing one
of the essential elements of a purchaser namely that of willingness.
The plaintiff did not procure a purchaser who was willing to buy the
land for the reason that he failed to
reach an agreement with Blanchett
as regards the purchase of the property, and after notice of revocation
was given to Blanchett he had ten
days in which to close the deal which
he was unable to do. If Hardesty
were willing to buy the land he would
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have effected an agreement with
Blanchett during this time.
He did not complete the undertaking within the time and upon the
terms stipulated. It was stipulated
in the contract that the defendant reserved the right to revoke the agency
upon a ten days written notice. The
defendant gave such notice. This
fact is admitted by the plaintiff. It
has also been proven that the property was sold by defendant five days
after the plaintiff's authority was revoked.
The principal did not interfere in
any way with Blanchett while he was
making negotiations. This fact was
never raised during the trial, so it
may be disposed of without further
comment.
The defendant contends t h a t
where there is a contract in writing
the contract itself must govern. The
contract is complete and is not ambiguous; for this reason it is n6t necessary that the court interfere with
its terms, and those terms as they
stand should govern the case.
The celebrated case of Fultz vs.
Wimer, 9 Pac. 316, analagous to the
present case, supports our contention. This action was commenced by
the plaintiff G. R. Fultz against the
defendant David J. Wimer, to recover the sum of $65, which the
plaintiff claimed was due him from
the defendant for services rendered
by him in selling the defendant's
'farm. Fultz who was a real estate
agent entered into a written contract
with the owner of land (namely, D.
J. Wimer) that his farm should be
left with him for sale for the term of
two months, and that in case of a sale
within that time, whether made by
the agent, the land owner, or others,
the agent is to receive a commission
of five per cent. Fultz took one C.

Galli out and showed him Wimer's
land, and tried to sell it to him at two
different times. Fultz also introduced Galli to Wimer informing him
that Galli wanted to buy his farm.
Galli agreed to buy the farm during
the time allotted Fultz to make the
sale but did not actually buy the land
until the expiration of that time. The
1court held: Upon the pleadings, the
plaintiff is bound by the special contract. Courts can only enforce contracts as the parties themselves made
them. It is doubtless true that Fultz
was instrumental in enabling the defendant to sell his land; but as Fultz
and Weimer had entered into a written stipulation as to the terms upon
which Fultz was entitled to commission, these stipulations must control.
Fultz, failed to find or produce a purchaser who was willing to take the
farm and pay the money within the
time prescribed.
In this case the parties were not
brought to an agreement through the
efforts of the broker. True Hardesty
was introduced to Taylor through the
efforts of Blanchett, but this is all
that was done by him toward effecting an agreement as all his efforts
failed. It is therefore a well established fact in law that the broker
cannot claim his commissions on a
sale of realty where he has not
brought the parties to an agreement
even though his principal sells to the
same man with which he had been
negotiating. A similar situation
arose in the case of Sibbald vs. Bethlehem Iron Co., reported in 38 Am.
Rep. 441. Here the defendant employed the plaintiff to sell the steel
rails of the former's manufacture to
the Grand Trunk Ry. Co. Plaintiff
negotiated with the Grand Trunk
Ry. Co., and during such negotiations
was discharged by the defendant.
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The defendant knowing of the previous negotiations between plaintiff
and aforesaid railway company secured one Evans who later sold steel
rails to the railway company. Plaintiff brought suit for his commissions.
The ruling of the court was: "That
the plaintiff had not made a bargain,
he failed to bring buyer and seller to
'an .agreement and therefore is not
entitled to his commissions. A broker
is never entitled to his commissions
for unsuccessful efforts. This is a
well establisheda rule. The broker
may devote his time and labor, and
expend his money with ever so much
of devotion to the interest of his employer, and yet if he fails, if without
effecting an agreement or accomplishing a bargain, he abandons the
effort, or his authority is fairly and
in good faith terminated, he gains
no right to commissions. And in such
event it matters not that after his
failure, and the termination of his
agency, what he had done proves of
use and benefit to the principal."
It is our contention that the principal had the authority to revoke the
agency under the terms stipulated in
the contract and that such agency
was revoked at the time of the sale
of the land in controversy and that
the agent is not entitled to his commission. In the case of Donovan vs.
Weed reported in 182 N. Y. 43 and
745 N. E. 563, the New York Court
held: "A man's authority to a broker
to sell his property or to find him a
purchaser is revocable at any time."
It is only logical to assume that had
the property been left in the agents
hands for an unreasonable length of
time there would have been a sale.
But is the principal bound to tie up
his property in the hands of an agent
just because the agent happens to be
negotiating with some person and

creating no noticeable results as regards the sale of the property? We
think not, and we feel that the learned court will agree with us upon this
question. In the case of McClare vs.
Paine 49 N. Y. 561 also 10 Am. Re,ports 431, the ruling of the court
was: "If the broker fails to effect a
sale within a reasonable time, and
his agency is terminated in good
faith by his principal, who afterwards consummates the sale, he will
not be entitled to commissions on
uch sale, even though the broker
may have originally introduced such
purchaser."
It is impossible to conceive of a
case where a person of sound mind
would hire a broker merely to procure an introduction to some person
who might buy some lands he has
for sale. Or the broker merely by
introducing a prospective purchaser
to his principal, and in no way effecting a, sale, to cause the principal to
become liable to him for commissions. The law as regards the duties of a broker has been well stated
in the case of Barnard vs. Monnot,
reported in 34 Barb. 90. In this case
the court held: "The duty of a broker
consists in bringing the minds of the
vendor and vendee to an agreement."
The evidence in this case clearly
establishes the fact that Blanchett
did nothing to aid Taylor in closing
the deal for the sale of his realty after his discharge. Previous to his
discharge he was unsuccessful in
closing the deal. For the above reasons we, the appellant, contend that
Blanchett was not the procuring
cause of the sale of Taylor's real estate. Under the words "Procuring
Cause" in "Words and Phrases," we
find the following definition, which
is also supported by the case of Ware
vs. Don Passos, a New York case re-
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ported in 38 N. Y. Supp. 673: "A upon the terms stipulated. (3) The
procuring cause, as used in the sense broker's default can in no way be atof a real estate broker procuring for tributed to an interference of the
a client a purchaser, means the orig- principal. Our contention is that
inal discovery of the purchaser by the trial court erred grossly in overthe broker, and the starting of the ruling the appellant's motion for a
negotiations by him, together with new trial.
Wherefore the appellant prays
the final closing by or on behalf of
his client with the purchaser through that the learned Supreme Court of
Notre Dame will remand the case
the efforts of the broker."
In concluding, the appellant be- to the trial court with instructions
lieves that he is entitled to a reversal to grant a new trial.
Respectfully submitted to the Honof the judgment of the trial court on
orable, the Supreme Court of Notre
the following three grounds:
(1)
That the broker undertook to pro- Dame, Indiana, for just consideracure a purchaser and failed to do so. tion and solution.
(2) That the broker did not complete
Henry W. Fritz,
Att'y. for Appellant.
the undertaking within the time and

BRIEF OF WILLIAM S. ALLEN IN CASE OF
TAYLOR VS. BLANCHETT
The second count alleged that the
plaintiff entered into a contract in
writing with the defendant, which
In the Supreme Court of Notre Dame provided that defendant placed his
land with the plaintiff for sale; that
Albert B. Taylor, Appellant,
defendant agreed to pay the plainVS.
tiff one dollar per acre of said real
Earnest M. Blanchett, Appellee.
estate commission out of the first
Brief for Appellee.
funds received in payment on account of such sale or on the exchange
NATURE OF THE ACTION
This is an action in special as- of said property, in case a purchaser
sumpsit by which the appellee, plain- is found of said property is sold
tiff below, sought judgment against or exchanged through plaintiff,
the appellant, defendant below, on a or through his influence, or if
contract which he alleged he per- he assists in any way in the
formed, thereby entitling him to sale or exchange of said propcommissions he earned acting under erty; that defendant reserved the
Iright to withdraw property at any
that contract.
time by giving a ten day notice in
WHAT THE ISSUES WERE
writing; and that under this contract
The plaintiff filed a declaration in Blanchett had introduced one Hardthe three counts to which the defend- esty to the defendant who was ready,
ant filed a general and special demur- willing and able to buy and that the
rer. The court sustained the demur- property was sold by the defendant
rer to the first count and overruled to Hardesty but the commission was
it as to the other counts.
(refused.

State of Indiana,
County of St. Joseph, ss
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The third count alleged all that the
second count alleged and also that
the price has been paid to the defendant by Hardesty.
The defendant then filed his plea in
two counts. The first count was a
general traverse. In his second
count the defendant alleged that he
had given notice to the plaintiff in
writing of the revocation of the
agency and was therefore not bound
to pay any commission under the
contract, since the sale took place after such revocation.
To the second count of the plea the
plaintiff filed a demurrer which the
court overruled and the plaintiff then
filed a replication in general denial.
After the trial, the Court returned a
finding for the plaintiff. Defendant
filed a motion for a new trial which
was denied by the court. Judgment
was rendered and this appeal was
brought.
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
1. The general rule-subsequent
negotiation through the owner does
not affect commission since the broker showed that the land was for sale.
Corum vs. Arnold, 137 S. W. 622,
Missouri. Heaton et al. vs. Edwards,
51 N. W. 544, Michigan. Graves vs.
Baines, 14 S. W. 256, Texas. West
Bros. vs. Thompson & Greer, 106 S.
W. 1134, Texas. Pierce vs. Nichols,
110 S. W. 206, Texas.
2. When a broker is employed to
find a purchaser for his principal's
-property on specific terms he is entitled to his commissions when he
produces to his principal a person
who is ready, willing and able to buy
on such terms. Handley vs. Shaffer,
59 So. 286, Alabama. Morris vs.
Clark, 80 So. 406, Alabama.
3. Under special contract providing that the agency may be termin-

ated by a written notice of a certain
number of days, if, after the broker
has introduced a prospective purchaser to the owner of the property,
the owner sends a revocation of authority and later sells to this purchaser, the broker is entitled to commissions since he has been the procuring cause of the sale and has comp'lied with the contract. Weisels-Gerhart Real Estate Co. vs. Epstein, 137
S. W. 326, Missouri. Scott vs. Patterson, 19 S. W. 419, Arkansas. Montgonery vs. Amsler, 122 S. W. 307,
Texas. Wells vs. Andreas, 115 N. W.
792 Wisconsin.
4. A broker earns a commission
where he brings the property which
he is employed to sell to the attention
of a third person and then turns that
person over to his employer and the
property is sold as the result of negotiations between the two so begun.
Johnstone vs. Cochrane, 121 N. E.
531, Massachusetts.
Desmond vs.
Stebbins, 5 N. E. 150, Massachusetts. Willard vs. Wright, 89 N. E.
559, Massachusetts.
5. Bad faith presumed where
there was revocation after the purIchaser was found. Cadigan vs. Crabtree, 78 N. E. 412, Massachusetts.
Dodge vs. Childers, 151 S. W. 749,
Missouri.
6. Since, at the time of the revoca'tion, the agent had negotiations for
a sale pending with a party whom he
had introduced to the owner, and the
owner had himself participated in
such negotiations, and, afterward.
the negotiations are continued, or
within a few days renewed, and consummated by the owner in person or
through another, the agent is entitled to his commissions. Maddox
vs. Harding, 135 N. W. 1019, Nebraska. McCray & Son vs. Pfost, 94
S. W. 998, Missouri. Martin vs. Holly
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10 S. E. 83, North Carolina. Knox
vs. Parker, 25 Pac. 909, Washington.
7. The agent's authority cannot be
revoked as to those acts already performed by him. (Mechem on Agency,
Page 63.)
ARGUMENT
The counsel for the appellant has
based his appeal on the fact that the
defendant Taylor, acting under the
contract, and sending a revocation
of agency in writing to the broker,
had thereby released himself from
any further obligation under the contract.
It is a well known rule in agency
that the "principal cannot revoke the
agent's author!tv as to those acts already performed by him,"-Mechem
on Agency, Page 63; and the contention of the counsel for the broker is
that he (Blanchett) had performed
his part of the contract before the
agency was revoked. He was the
procuring cause of the sale because
he introduced Hardesty, the purchaser, to the owner. At the moment he introduced a purchaser
ready, able and willing to buy, he had
performed his part of the contract
so as to entitle him to his commission. For the contract provides that
"Taylor agrees to pay to said Blanchett one Dollar per acre of said real
estate commission out of the first
funds received in payment on account of such sale or exchange of
said property (1) in case a purchaser is found, (2) said property
or exchanged through
is sold
(3) through his
said Blanchett,
influence, (4) if he assists in any
way in the sale or exchange of said
property." Therefore, by complying
with any one of the provisions set
forth, Blanchett could earn his commission and fulfill his part of the

contract which he must do before he
can recover thereon. His commission after performing any one of the
above provisions could in no way be
affected by any revocation subsequent to that time on account of the
fundamental principle of agony
above set forth. And the payment
of the price is not a consideration
Blanchett agreed to fulfill but a condition precedent to the payment of
the commission. The price has been
paid, and consequently, there is nothing to bar the commission.
But the counsel for the appellant
quotes Fultz vs. Wimer, 9 Pac. 316,
a Kansas case under a special contract, to sustain their point. In this
case the broker by a written contract,
was given two months in which to
sell the land but he failed to do so
within that time. Later the owner
sold to the purchaser introduced by
the broker. The court, in that case,
said in substance, that courts can
only enforce contracts as parties
themselves made them; under terms
it was only to be left for two months
with the broker; the broker failed to
perform within time allowed and after expiration of the contract time
the sale was made by the owner who
then had a right to sell to anyone and
he would not be liable for commission.
This case is to be distinguished
from the one at bar-first, because
there is a time limit in the contract
in the Kansas case, and secondly, because the broker was required to sell
the land in that case which he failed
to do within the time given.
But neither of these provisions
was in the present contract which
could be performed in any one of
four ways, and within an indefinite
time. That contract was to sell, in
this one if a purchaser was found he
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was to receive his commission and it
is admitted that he found a purchaser. The case is not analogous to the
one at bar nor does the ruling apply
to it.
In Weisels-Gerhart Real Estate
Co., vs. Epstein, 137 S. W. 326, a
Missouri case, the facts in brief are
as follows: The plaintiff, a corporation, was employed to procure a
purchaser for the residence of the defendant. The contract of agency
was executed by defendant in writing and it stipulated that the plaintiff should have for his commission
2 1-2 per cent of the amount of the
sale made; it conferred an exclusive
agency but stipulated that the authority might be revoked by the defendant on 15 days written notice to
the plaintiff. Immediately the plaintiff advertised the property and the
attention of one Mr. Mathes was directed to it. A member of the firm
spoke to him about it and then Mr.
Mathes inspected the house; then the
broker notified the defendant that he
thad a prospective buyer, and had
opened negotiations
with
Mr.
Mathes. This was on December 22.
On January 10th defendant notified
the plaintiff in writing that his
agency was revoked. On February
4th an agreement for the sale of the
property was entered into by the defendant directly with Mathes and
during this month the sale of property was consummated by the owner.
Broker sued for commissions earned
under this contract.
The Missouri court in holding the
owner liable for commissions said:
"'When the plaintiff acted with reasonable diligence, and defendant revoked his agency without cause to
make sale to a person called to his attention by the agent, and with whom
the agent was negotiating, to escape

payment of commission, then a right
of recovery appears, for law will not
permit agency to be thus terminated
by the principal in the midst of the
negotiations to the end of defeating
agent's rights. The plaintiff in this
case was the procuring cause of the
sale and can recover his commission
under the contract." This case is
identical with the present one and
the ruling of the court here represents the settled law on this point.
But the courts have gone even further than this in holding brokers entitled to commissions in similar
cases.
In Scott vs. Patterson, 53 Ark. 49,
19 S. W. 419, the real estate broker
said to the owner of the land that he
had done all he could to sell the land
to the prospective purchaser and that
he was unable to do so, and that he
"turned her (the prospective purchaser) over" to the owner; that he
might sell her the land if he could.
The owner finally made the sale. He
testified that he had nothing to do
with the selling of the property bntil
the brokers declined to have anything more to do with it.
The court, quoting from Tyler vs.
Parr, 52 Mo. 249, said, "The law is
well settled that in a suit by a real
estate agent for the amount of his
commissions it is immaterial that
the owner sold the property and concluded the bargain. If, after the
property is placed in the agent's
'hands, the sale is brought about or
produced by his advertisements or
exertions, he will be entitled to commissions. Or, if the agent introduces
the purchaser or discloses his name
to the owner, and through such introduction or disclosure negotiations
are begun, and the sale of property
is effected, the agent is entitled to his
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commission though the sale be made
by the owner."
This ruling is in effect generally
and has been laid down in the following cases similar to the present one:
Wells vs. Andreas, 115 N. W. 792,
Wisconsin. Montgomery vs. Amsler, 122 S.W. 307, Texas. Johnstone
vs. Cochrane, 121 N. E. 531, Massachusetts. Desmond vs. Stebbins, 5
N. E. 150, Massachusetts. Willard
vs. Wright, 89 N. E. 559, Massachusetts. Maddox vs. Harding, 135 N.
W. 1019, Nebraska. McCray & Son
vs. Pfost, 94 S. W. 998, Missouri.
artin vs. Holly, 10 S. E. 83, North
!Carolina. Knox vs. Parker, 25 Pac.
909, Washington.
Some courts have gone so far as
to rule that a revocation under such
conditions is in bad faith. In Cadigan vs. Crabtree, 78 N. E. 412, the
Massachusetts Court said: "It perhaps might be assumed that a broker's authority is revoked in bad faith
where negotiations had been carried
on by the broker for the principal
and had progressed so far at the time
when the broker's authority was revoked that he was found to be the
efficient cause in fact of a trade sub;equently struck between the principal and customer. In such a case it
would seem that the finding that the
broker was the efficient cause of the
trade made includes a finding that
the revocation was in fraud of his
rights." The Missouri court handed
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down a similar decision in Dodge vs.
Childers, 151 S. W. 749.
In all of the cases given the revocation of the agency of the broker has
not affected his right to commission
and some of them have even held that
the right to commission existed where
the contract provided for the sale of
the land by the broker and the performance was by the owner after revocation. But all concur in sustaining the rule that if the contract provided that the commission shall be
paid if a purchaser is found, subseqaent negotiations and sale by the
owner of the land do not take from
the broker his right to commissions,
even though there has been a revocation under a special contract. In
conclusion the appellee believes that
the decision of the Circuit Court was
correct in awarding a judgment to
the plaintiff broker for his commissions earned under the written contract because he had performed his
part of the contract and no revocation can affect the agent's authority
as to those acts already performed
by him.
Wherefore the appellee prays that
the decision of the lower court be
sustained.
Respectfully submitted to the Honorable, the Supreme Court of Notre
Dame.
William S. Allen,
Attorney for the Appellee.

CIRCUIT

Be it Remembered, That, to-wit:
On Monday, September 19, 1921, the
Notre Dame Circuit Court was duly
organized for the year, with Hon.
Francis J. Vurpillat as regular Judge
presiding, and the other officers of
court duly elected, qualified and act-
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ing, to-wit: Edwin J. McCarthy,
Clerk of the Court, and Edward J.
Dundon, Sheriff.
Court was opened in due form and
the following proceedings were had
and orders made, to-wit:
In re Jury Commissioners for the
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year 1921-1922: The Court appoints
J. Paul Cullen and James E. Murphy,
two competent persons, residents and
legal voters of Notre Dame, Indiana,
and opposite political affiliations, to
act as Jury Commissioners for the
year 1921-1922, who now come into
open court and are qualified as such
Jury Commissioners.
The following rules of court were
promulgated and ordered to be
spread of record: (Here Insert)
In re Court Stenographer: The
'court now appoints John F. Heffer/man to be the official court stenographer of this court for the ensuing
year, 1921-1922. Comes now said
*Hefferman and qualified as such
stenographer by taking the oath of
office.
CAUSE NO. 23.
John D. Carsons, Administrator,
Estate of Ray Stevens, Decd.
VS.

Charles D. Simpson, and
Edward Williams.
'Edward J. Dundon, and
John Killilea,
Attorneys for the Plaintiff.
Clarence R. Smith, and
William A. Miner,
Attorneys for the Defendant.
TRIAL RECORD.
(Continued)
The cause being at issue the jury
is empannelled and sworn and the
case submitted to trial.
Trial is begun and the plaintiff's
case in chief is concluded. Defendant
files a motion for a non-suit, which
motion is overruled and an exception
is granted to the defendant.
Defendant begins his case in chief.
Defendant rests his case in chief.
And the trial of this case is concluded. Defendant now files a motion
for a directed verdict, which motion

is overruled and 4n exception is
granted.
Plaintiff now tenders instructions
numbered one and two with a request in writing that each of them be
given to the jury. The defendant also
tenders instructions numbered from
one to six inclusive, with a request in
writing that each and all of them be
given to the jury. The court now indicates which of the instructions will
be granted and which will be refused; which instructions are ordered filed and made a part of this record without a bill of exceptions.
The jury now retires in charge of
a sworn jury bailiff to deliberate
upon the case and arrive at a verdict.
Come again the jury into open court
with their general verdict, to-wit:
"We, the jury, find for the plaintiff,
that he is the owner of the property
described in the complaint, to-wit:
One horse, brown in color, three
years old, white spot on the forehead,
white stocking on the left hind leg, a
slit in one ear; and that the plaintiff
is entitled to the property and the
immediate possession thereof.
"J. P. Brady, Foreman."
Come now the parties by their
counsel and the defendant moves the
court for a non obstante veridicto.
Motion is overruled and defendants
separately except. The defendants
now file separate motions for a new
trial. Court overrules the motions
and the defendants separately except.
Court now renders judgment upon
the verdict in favor of the plaintiff
against the defendants, to which the
defendants separately except.
Defendants now pray an appeal to
the Supreme Court of Notre Dame,
which is granted, and five days are
-given in which to file the general bill
of exceptions. Ten days are given the
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said defendants in which to file their
appeal bond in the sum of $500.00,
with Jerome Dixon and Raymond
Kerns as sureties, which bond so ex'ecuted and filed is hereby approved.
CAUSE NO. 24.
James Mansfield
VS.
Daniel O'Connor.
Edwin McCarthy and
Mark R. Healey,
Attorneys for the Plaintiff.
Jos. H. Farley and
K. W. Nyhan,
Attorneys for the Defendant.
TRIAL RECORD.
Plaintiff shows to the court that on
September 28th, 1921, he filed his
complaint and praecipe for summons. Return of the sheriff filed.
Plaintiff's complaint in one paragraph and alleges: "That on and before the 19th day of October, 1919,
the defendant wrongfully kept and
harbored in the said county and state,
a certain dog which was fierce, vicious and dangerous, and which was
accustomed to attack and bite mankind, all of which the defendant well
knew during all of the time that he so
kept and harbored the said dog. That
the defendant wrongfully and negligently allowed the said dog to go at
large without being properly muzzled or confined. And that on said
date, while the said defendant so
owned and harbored said dog, and
while he so suffered it to run at large,
the said dog attacked and bit and
wounded the plaintiff, by biting him
three times, tearing and lacerating
the flesh and seriously injuring him
and throwing him to the ground.
That thereby the plaintiff became
became sick and sore and lame, and
so continued for a space of seven

months then next ensuing, and was
prevented during all of that time
from the performance of any service
or doing any business whatsoever,
and that he expended the sum of
$1000.00 in endeavoring to be cured
of said sickness and lameness; and
that in the course of the aforesaid
seven months he was damaged to the
extent of $1,100.00. His salary for
seven months, all to the piantiff's
damage in the sum of $2,100.00.
Wherefore the plaintiff sues and demands judgment for the afore-mentioned sum of $2,100.00."
Comes now the defendant by counsel and moves the court to strike out
certain parts of the complaint "fierce,
vicious and dangerous." Motion overruled, exception taken. Defendant
now files a motion to make the complaint more specific in the description of the dog. Motion sustained.
Plaintiff files amended complaint
describing dog as follows: "Large
grey whippet hound with a long
strong tail, large head and massive
jaws, and mouse-colored eyes."
Defendant files demurrer to the
amended complaint. Demurrer overruled, exception for defendant. Counsel for the defendant files answer in
two paragraphs, -(1) general denial;
(2) confession and avoidance on the
ground that the plaintiff at the time
of his injury was a trespasser upon
the premises of defendant, and that
had no knowledge that defendant
harbored such a dog.
Plaintiff files reply to the second
paragraph of the defendants answer.
Cause being at issue jury empannelled and sworn, and case submitted
to trial. Trial had and concluded.
Plaintiff now tenders instructions
numbered from one to three inclusive
together with a request in writing
that each and all of them be given to
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the jury. Defendant also tenders instructions numbered from one to
three inclusive with a request in
writing that each and all of them be
given to the jury. The court now indicates which instruction will be
given and which refused, which instructions are ordered filed and made
a part of this record without a bill of
exceptions.
Arguments of the counsel are now
heard and the court instructs the
jury, and files the instructions numbered from one to seven inclusive,
ordered a part of this record without
a bill of exceptions.
The jury now retire in charge of a
sworn jury bailiff to deliberate upon
the case and arrive at a verdict. Come
again the jury into open court with
their general verdict, to-wit: "We,
the jury, find for the plaintiff and
assess his damages in the sum of
$2,100.00.
"John Killilea, Foreman."
CAUSE NO. 25.
Sadie Thompson, by her Next Friend
VS.
Carl Meyne.
Frank M. Hughes and
Paul Paden,
Attorneys for the Plaintiff.
J. Paul Schwertly and
Raymond Kerns,
Attorneys for the Defendant.
TRIAL RECORD.
Comes now the attorneys for the
plaintiff and show to the court that
they filed their complaint and praecipe for summons on October 19th,
1921. Return of the sheriff. Plaintiff's complaint in one paragraph and
alleges as follows: "That the said
defendant is indebted to the said
plaintiff in the sum of two dollars per
week for a period of one hundred and

fifty-six weeks, over and above board,
lodging and clothing, for work, labor
and services, rendered by her for the
said defendant'at his special instance
and request, at the said County of St.
Joseph by this plaintiff at divers
times between the first day of July,
1918, and the beginning of this action, in and about, carrying on and
conducting the defendant's business
as a household servant and laborer,
doing various kinds of household
work, cleaning, cooking, churning,
milking cows, feeding and carrying
water for the stock, chickens, and
horses, in and about the defendant's
farm in the said county. That the defendant promised to pay the plaintiff
whatever these services were reasonably worth. That said work, labor
and services were reasonably worth
two dollars a week, for a period of
156 weeks, amounting to $312.00
over and above board and clothing.
That said sum is wholly due and unpaid. Wherefore plaintiff prays judgment for three hundred and twelve
dollars."
Comes the defendant and files a
motion to require the plaintiff to separate her causes of action into separate paragraphs. Motion overruled,
exception for the defense. Defendant
now moves the court to strike out
certain parts of the complaint as surplusage.
Motion sustained. Defendants demurrer to the complaint.
Demurrer overruled, and exception.
Defendant files answer in two paragraphs: (1) general denial; (2) confession and avoidance, that she was
in the house of the defendant and did
work as a member of his family, not
as a servant girl, and that she received support and education from
defendant as a member of his family.
Plaintiff files reply to second paragraph of answer.
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Cause being at issue the jury is
empannelled and sworn, and cause
submitted for trial.
Trial begun and the plaintiff concludes her case in chief. Defendant
moves to non-suit the plaintiff. Motion overruled, and exception. Trial
concluded.
Plaintiff now tenders instructions
numbered one and two with a request in writing that each of them be
given to the jury. Defendant also
tenders instructions numbered from
one to four inclusive accompanied by
a request in writing that each and all
of them be given to the jury. The
court now indicates which instruction will be given and which refused,
which in structions are ordered filed

JUNIOR

and made a part of this record, without bill of exceptions.
Arguments for the plaintiff and
the defendant are now heard and the
court instructs the jury, and files the
instructions with the clerk and orders that they be made a part of this
record without a bill of exceptions.
The jury now retire in charge of a
sworn jury bailiff to deliberate upon
the case and arrive at a verdict.
Come again the jury into open court
with their general verdict, to-wit:
"We, the jury, find for he defendant
against the plaintiff.
"John Paul Cullen, Foreman."

MOOT

Edwin J. McCarthy,
Clerk of Court.

COURT

gested the sale to him by the defendant of defendant's share in said concern; and the defendant then actually offered to sell to plaintiff for the
sum of $20,000 his undivided share
in the concern. On July 5th, following, the plaintiff came to defendant
and asked him to hold the offer open
till the 1st day of August, ensuing.
Defendant, not willing to hold the
offer open for that length of time because, as he said, he had another
chance to sell, plaintiff offered and
CAUSE NO. 1
defendant accepted fifty dollars to
James Milburn
the offer open till August 1st.
hold
VS.
On July 15th, in a readjustment of
Willis Harmon
the
partnership, Robert Smith sold
STATEMENT OF FACTS
out
to the defendant his undivided
tothe
defendant,
Plaintiff and
interest
and Jones also transferred
gether with Samuel Jones and Robto another.
interest
his
ert Benton, were partners, owning
30th,
the plaintiff went to
On
July
and operating in equal shares the
to
accept the offer
defendant
the
mercantile establishment known as
to
expire
on August 1st,
which
was
the Economy Store in South Bend,
to detendered
and
there
and
then
Indiana, a prosperous concern valthe
demanded
$20,000
and
fendant
ued at 75,000.
of
defendant
by
the
On July lsL, 1920, plaintiff sug- transfer to him

The following cases were presented to the court by oral argument as
well as briefs upon the hypothetical
state of acts. Only the principal
propositions and the cases or authorities supporting them are here reported. These cases will later be developed and submitted for trial in
the Notre Dame Circuit Court by the
lawyers who argued them in thjs
court. The statements of fact with
propositions and authorities follow:
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the latter's undivided interest in the Wagner, (Mich.) 10 N. W. 37-13 N.
Economy Store, which the defendant W. 522.
refused -to do, not offering to deliver
CAUSE NO. 2.
to plaintiff any part of his interest
Charles Slaggert
therein.
VS.
Plaintiff brings his tender into
John H. Barrett
court and in his actkun seeks judgSTATEMENT OF FACTS
ment for damages for the breach of
the alleged contract.
Defendant, John H. Barrett,. was a
Who is entitled to recover?
stock buyer of 20 years experience,
engaged in buying stock on the hoof
Edward J. Lennon and
throughout
the country, particularly
Edmund C. Tschudi,
in
St
.Joseph
County, Indiana. On
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
January
15th,
1921,
in company with
A partner's share is definite at all
Jake
Adams,
an
employee,
of expertimes-what he would take upon disience
in
judging
cattle,
the
defendant
solution of the partnership. Mechem's Elements of Partnership; Sin- came to the country home of plaintiff
delar vs. Walker, 137 Ill. 4-27 N. E. and negotiated with him for the pur59-31 Am. St. Rep. 353; Nenaugh vs. chase of 20 head of Hereford steers.
Whitehall, 52 N. Y. 146-11 Am. Rep. Defendant and Adams inspected the
693. Plaintiff paid a consideration steers and offered plaintiff $2,000 for
for an option to buy and the right to them, which offer plaintiff agreed to
buy defendant's partnership interest accept. It was also agreed that
at any time within the stipulated per- plaintiff was to deliver the steers to
iod. 6 R. C. L. Contracts; Thompson defendant in South Bend, Indiana, on
vs. Bescher, (N. C.) 97 $. E. 654; the morning of January 16th, 1921.
On January 16th, about 10 o'clock
Murphy-Thompson vs. Reid, 101 S.
a.
m., plaintiff brought the steers to
W. 964. Unexpected hardship or inSouth
Bend, to the stock yards,
convenience in performance no defense or excuse. I. R. C. L. 6; Marx which was the accustomed place for
vs. Kilby Locomotive & Mach. Wks., delivery of stock, and here met the
50 So. 136; Ptacek vs Pisa, 83 N. E. defendant who refused to accept the
221; Cotrell & Son vs. Smokeless Fuel delivery or to pay the purchase price,
giving as reason that he feared the
Co., 184 Fed. 594.
steers might be infected with the hoof
John C. Cochrane and
and mouth disease then prevalent in
Linus C. Glotzbach,
the community. Plaintiff insisted on
Attorneys for Defendant.
delivery and acceptance of the steers,
Plaintiff knew fifteen days before stating to the defendant that he well
accepting that defendant had acquir- knew all about the disease prevalent
ed another partner's interest since in the country at the time he agreed
making his offer to sell his own, for to purchase the cattle; that he and
notice thereof is required by the law his man had inspected the steers
of partnership. Eagle vs. Butcher, fully at the time of the agreed pur67 Am. Dec. 343. There was no mu- chase; that the steers and none of
tuality of contract or meeting of the them were affected by the disease,
minds in plaintiff's acceptance and and that he, defendant must keep his
defendant's offer.
Eggleston vs. contract. Plaintiff then formally of-

NOTRE DAME LAW REPORTER
fered to deliver the steers and demanded of defendant the agreed purchase price of $2,000. Defendant refused.
Plaintiff was compelled to return
the steers to his home, and to sell
them in the open market for $300
less than had been agreed upon, and
for this $300 and the damages plaintiff brings action.
Frank J. Kelly and
Albert J. Ficks,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
The doctrine of caveat emptor applies to defendant's purchase. Sweet
vs. Colgate, 11 Am. Dec. 266; 25 Am.
Dec. 276; ;35 L. R. A. (NS) 271. Delivering the cattle at the place agreed
upon by the defendant constitutes
delivery. 6 R. C. L. 322. Plaintiff fully peformed his contract. 52 L. R.
A. 260; 31 S. E. 525; 2 N. E. 387;
72 N. W. 752; 53 L. R. A. 108; 18
Atl 90; 19 So. 340.
Thomas J. Keating and
Matthew McEnery,
Attorneys for Defendant.
This is an oral contract for the
purchase of goods of the value of
more than fifty dollars, and is unenforcible under the statute of frauds.
2 Starkie on Evidence. 490; 22 N. E.
349; 64 N. W. 952; 96 Pac. 870; 62
Ind 485.
CAUSE NO. 3
Richard B. Swift
VS.
Henry W. Kearnes
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant, Kearnes, met plaintiff,
Swift, and, in conversation stated to
Swift that he had heard considerable
about Swift's horse, named Swift
Richard, and of racing stock. A few
weels later, August 1, 1921, Swift
directed and mailed to Kearnes the
following letter:

"Grand Rapids, Mich.,
"Aug. 1, '21
Mr. Henry W. Kearnes,
South Bend, Indiana.
"Dear Sir:"Referring to our recent conversation about my horse, am writing to
say that you can buy the horse, Swift
Richard, for One Thousand Dollars,
you paying me that amount in cash
or executing your promisory note for
that sum payable to me in thirty
days.
"Yours truly,
"R. B. Swift."
(Signed)
On August 15, 1921, in reply to
Swift's letted, Kearnes sent the following letter:
"South Bend, Ind.,
"Aug. 15th, 1921.
"Mr. Richard B. Swift,
"Grand Rapids, Mich.
"Dear Sir:"I have your letter of the 1st
instant. I like your horse pretty
well, as I stated when I last saw you.
And your proposition does not seem
high, if the horse meets my expectation. I don't want to buy him, however, until I can look him over carefully. We might come to a deal then.
I'll think the matter over.
"Yours very truly,
(Signed)
"H. W. Kearnes."
On the 30th day of August, 1921,
Mr. Swift sent the horse in charge of
his keeper and driver, Mr. Charles
Owens. to the defendant Kearnes,
with instructions to take the horse
to Kearnes. Upon arriving in South
Bend, Indiana, Owens drove the horse
to the home of Kearnes and told him
that Swift had directed him to do so.
Whereupon Kearnes, after "sizing
up" the horse, said "Well, he really
looks good. I believe you can leave
him Owens."
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On September 1st, 1921, Swift,
wrote Kearnes for the $1,000, and
Kearnes replied: "I did not buy the
horse; you may have him any time."
Next, Kearnes, on Sept. 3rd, offered
to return the horse, but Swift refused
to accept the return of the horse and
brought action.
Lyle E. Miller and
Chas. E. Robitaille,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
There was contract offer and acceptance in terms of offer, Lockwood
vs. Robbins, 125 Ind. 398; in re Greis,
308; Stagg vs. Compton, 81 Ind. 171;
Train vs. Gold (Mass.) 28 Am. Dec.
374; Sturgis vs. Robbins, 28 Am.
Dec. 374. Delivery of the horse takes
the case out of the operation of the
statute of frauds. Coffin vs. Bradbury. 3 Idaho 770-95 Am. St. Rep.
37; Hinkle vs. Fischer, 104 Ind. 843 N. E. 624.
Edward W. Gould and
Eugene M. Hines,
Attorneys for Defendant.
There was not sufficient acceptance
and delivery to take the contract out
of the statute of frauds. Defendant
took possession of the horse for purpose of "carefully examining" him
and did not intend acceptance by
Clark on
merely "sizing him up."
L. R.
1915
127;
Contracts, pages 121,
29
L.
A. 824: 4 L. R. A. (NS) 177;
R. A. 431.
CAUSE NO. 4
Thomas Watkins and Jacob
Hines as Watkins & Hines, Partners,
Vs.
Jonathan Reidenhor
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff are doing a mercantile business as a partnership, operating under the firm name of Watkins & Hines. Their place of business
is corner of Colfax and Michigan

Streets in the City of South Bend,
Indiana.
On August 1, 1921, the defendant
purchased of the plaintiff 500 sacks
of stock food and gave his note for
$200, payable at The St. Joseph Loan
& Trust Company, Sept. 15, 1921,
with 6 per cent interest and attprney
fees.
Defendant owris and operates a
large stock farm in St. Joseph County, Indiana, where he resides, about
ten miles from South Bend. Defendant opened and used part of one
sack of the stock food and decided
that it was no good. Accordingly he
had the stock food examined by a
man who presumed to know the ingredients of such foods and experienced in handling and mixing them
for ten years. Several sacks were
thus examined and the defendant,
upon the advice of this inspector, a
Mr. James Cunningham, concluded
that the stock food was "no good,"
and called the plaintiff at their place
of business by telephone and told
them that "the stock food you sold
me is no good," and that he could not
use it.
The note having matured and not
having been paid, plaintiff brings action on the note.
The stock food is, in fact, no good
as a stock food, and defendant's purchase is hardly worth team hire to
carry it back.
Francis J. Galvin and
Daniel D. Lynch,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
The doctrine that articles sold for
food are impliedly warranted to be
sound and wholesome extends only
to food sold for human consumption
and not to food for animals. National
Cotton Oil Co. vs. Young, 85 S. W.
42; Lukes vs. Freund, 41 Am. Rep.
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429. The law presumes that a buyer his Packard car and was thereby
who fails to exact an express war- thrown violently against the stone
ranty relies on his own judgment. pavement and street, sustaining a
Davis vs. Murphy, 14 Ind. 158; Court fractured shoulder, broken arm,
bruised face and cut scalp, and a convs. Snyder, 2 Ind. App. 440.
cussion of the brain. Plaintiff's son,
J. Stanley Bradbury and
upon seeing the street car coming on
Joseph W. Nyikos,
without a stop, and intending to
Attorneys for Defendant.
avoid a collision, put on the acceleraThere was an implied warranty tor and succeeded in getting the
that the stock food was reasonably Packard across the street car track
fit for the purpose for which it was an instant or two before the street
ordered, buyer relying on seller's car passed, thus averting injury and
judgment. Sales Act, Sec. 15; Hun- damage to himself and his car.
ter vs. State, 73 Am. Dec. 168; Coyle
Plaintiff paid $500.00 for medical
vs. Baum, 41 Pac. 389; Houston vs. and surgical aid, $500.00 hospital
Cotton Oil Co. vs. Tramwell, 72 S. W. charges, was confined to the hospital
244; Hauk vs. Berg, 105 S. W. 1176; and his home for a period of three
Best vs. Flint, 5 Atl. 192.
months, losing $750 salary, and he
suffered pain and anguish, for all of
CAUSE NO. 5.
which he brings action against the
defendant street car company for
Andrew W. Grayham
$2000.00.
VS.
Plaintiff's action is founded on the
The Indiana Traction Company,
theory that it was defendant's duty
an Indiana Corporation.
to bring its street car to a full stop
before attempting to cross Colfax St.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Of course, had the plaintiff remained
Plaintiff was driving his Packard in his car, he would have averted the
car, going east in Colfax street, injuries just as his son did. And,
South Bend, Indiana. Plaintiff's son again, the son, by putting on the
was driving the car while plaintiff accelerator and suddenly starting or
himself rode in the rear seat. As the jerking the Packard forward, really
car approached Michigan street, de- caused the plaintiff to be thrown to
fendant's car driven by its servants the ground.
Jerome D. Blievernicht and
was also approaching Colfax street.
James P. Wilcox,
the
Plaintiff and his son, expecting
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
a
brought
to
car
to
be
defendant's
full stop before crossing Colfax
Plaintiff had equal right with destreet, continued to drive their Pack- fendant to use of crossing and, havard east. Defendant's servants did ing reached the crossing first, had
not stop the street car, but continued right to pass before the street car.
to travel across Colfax street.
12 Ohio St. 22. Defendant violated
Plaintiff, seeing the defendant's the city ordinance. South Bend Ordicar coming on without the accustom- nances, page 208, Secs. 6 and 7. Deed stop at the crossing, and fearing fendant's servants were negligent in
that a collision was inevitable, to operating street car. 107 Pac. 964;
avoid injury to himself, leaped from 10 L. R. A. (N.S.) 391.
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Henry J. Lauerman and
Joseph E. O'Brien,
Attorneys for Defendant.
Plaintiff had no reason to believe
that defendant's car would stop, and
is guilty of contributory negligence.
Cincinnati St. Ry. Co. vs. Murray,
(Ohio), 30 L. R. A. 508; Chicago
City Ry. Co. vs. Stramphel, 110 Ill.

ONLY

OUR

EDITORIALS
WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH THE LAW
REPORTER?

The Law Reporter is all right.
Just a little late, that's all-the November issue appearing in February.
The Reporter, which is printed by
OUR SUNDAY VISITOR at Huntington, Indiana, always had been
shipped to Notre Dame by parcel
post. But, for some unknown reason,
the April, 1921 number was sent by
express to South Bend. The local express office lost one of the two parcels. After three months of futile
complaint, correspondence and claimfiling, the lost parcel of reporters exposed itself to the local express company, which then actually delivered
it, after commencement. This unavoidably delayed the publication of
the June Reporter, which also came
during vacation. As a result the
Alumni received the April and June
Reporters in September, after the
return of the students.
This situation made collection of
alumni subscriptions impossible. A
deficit of two hundred and twentyfive dollars occurred to meet which
has caused the delay in resuming publication of the Reporter till now. Advanced subscriptions of the students
are used to meet the alumni delinquency, which we feel is due wholly

App. 482; Foulk vs. Wilmington City
Ry. Co., 60 Atl. 973; McCarthy vs.
Consolidated Ry. Co., 63 Atl. 725;
Mitchell vs. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.
E. 354. Plaintiff placed himself in a
perilous position in assuming that
street car would stop and in attempting to pass. 157 N. W. 860; 32 So.
797; 51 Am. Dec. 395; 13 Ill. App. 91.

OWN

OPINION

to the situation stated, and which we
hope may soon be cheerfully met by
prompt payment on the part of the
Old Boys of the Law School.
A reorganization of the Reporter
Staff has been made, and hereafter
the Reporter will appear upon a divided responsibility. With the editor-in-chief, four more chief editors
have been associated, Clarence Manion, John J. Buckley, Vincent B. Pater and Aaron H. Huguenard. This
will make possible not only the improvement of the existing departments but the addition of others, valuable and much desired.
One new feature, a section entitled
"Class-icks," appears with this issue.
Only a sample, however, of its contemplated character is exposed. This
department will be edited by our genial and talented upper-classman of
the Law School, candidate for the J.
D. and professor in the College of
Arts and Letters, Clarence Manion.
The student Editorial Section will be
in charge of the popular and progressive Ph. M. and prospective J. D.,
John J. Buckley. The News Section
of the student and alumni departments will be in charge, respectively
of Aaron H. Huguenard and Vincent
B. Pater, whose successful and aggressive college activities are well
known.
We hasten to assure our readers
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that the beautiful garb which the
Reporter has heretofore worn will
not be discarded for any velvet
knickerbockers, on account of the eccentricities and proclivities added to
the editorial staff.
Please gleefully offer an immediate transfusion of your golden blood
to the N. D. Law Reporter in its present aenemic condition, and watch the
Reporter grow bigger, better, brighter and "beautifuller." Gee, how that
last bee did sting.
E. I. C.

it hopes that he will continue in this
J. J. B.
writing.
THE RESEARCH COURSE

The course in Legal research work
has been intensified at Notre Dame
due to the efforts of The American
Law Book Publishing Co. This company is the publisher of "Corpus
Juris," the most comprehensive and
profound work ever compiled on the
general law. In order to promote
interest in the work, the Publishing
Company has offered a set of these
books to the man who shows the
PROF. TIERNAN'S BOOK
greatest proficiency in using them.
Prof. John P. Tiernan's book, This prize is enough to arouse inter"Conflict of Laws," is one of the est in any contest, but when the admost comprehensive works that has ditional fact of the information reever been written on this subject. ceived is taken into consideration,
Prof. Tiernan has succeeded in doing the value of the course is greatly inwhat no other writer on this difficult creased. Every step of the work is
and technical subject has been able practical. It is something that every
to do; he has boiled down and con- Lawyer should know and must know
densed the vast field of knowledge on if he is to be successful. The method
this subject into a volume of a little of Briefing which the Publisher's
more than one hundred pages. To have prepared is a legal education in
the student of law, this is a relief. itself. Building up a case is like
After wading through volumes con- writing the plot of a drama. The
sisting of from six hundred to eight value of the finished product depends
hundred pages, it is a great pleasure largely on the skill with which the
to encounter Prof. Tiernan's little; worker has used his tools. In Legal
book. This pleasure is enhanced by work, the collection of general law
the fact that the book is complete in cases are the tools. Knowledge of
every detail. Prof. Tiernan deserves their use means success; ignorance
great credit for this treatise. He is means failure. The Law Reporter
the first member of the Notre Dame advises every student of the Law to
Law College to engage in this field of get acquainted with this practical
work. It is a wonderful thing for a side of the Law Course. The student
Technical or Professional school to will feel the value of this work, as
have on its Faculty men who have soon as he begins to prepare for adwritten books on the subjects which mission to the Bar. The knowledge
they teach. It is a means of build- contained in Corpus Juris is accuring up faith in the students and it is ate and complete. It is arranged in
a source of confidence to the prospec- a systematic manner and it will aid
tive students. The Law Reporter the student to group his knowledge
takes this opportunity to thank Prof. systematically. It will cause him to
Tiernan for his wonderful work and remember a great portion of the law
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by means of association. No man
can work faithfully on this course
without reaping a valuable reward.
J. J. B.
THE DEAN
For some reason or other, a freshman found himself in Sorin Hall the
other day, and being there he decided
to look over the pictures before leaving. He had spent some thirty minutes gazing at the heroes of other
days when he came upon a picture of
the Class of '91.
He was about to pass it over cursorily when he saw "Francis J. Vurpillat" written in a striking hand
under the likeness of one of the graduates. "Why, there's the Dean of
the Law School," he said unconsciously. "The Judge hasn't been out
of school thirty years already, has
he?"
To those of us who have to look a
score and a half of years ahead, the
time seems interminably long. But
if it were our privilege to look back
on a career of thirty years like that
which Judge Vurpillat has had, it
would not be an exaggeration to say
three decades of years seem no more
than as many months.
In a recent address, a certain nationally-known educator said that too
many Catholic young men were willing to follow and not enough to lead;
too many Catholic lawyers were practicing before the bar and not enough
were sitting on the bench; too many
were sacrificing principle for the sake
of monetary reward. Of course, he
couched his ideas in elaborate language but that was the substance of
them.
As we sat there, listening to the
wonderful address, we couldn't help
thinking about the Judge and how

his accomplishments measured up to
the ideals set by the eminent speaker.
Indeed, it seemed as though the educator had rgulated his standards according to the Judge's career, so
closely does that career conform to
them.
Quite often do we read in story
books about men whose live§ are perfect, whose steps to success have
been certain and well-defined, whose
achievements with time have become
greater. But seldom do we have the
pleasure to witness such successes in
actual life. In the case of Judge Vurpillat, we have an exceptional example.
He was out of school but a short
time when he was elected Prosecuting
Attorney of the Forty-fourth Judicial
Circuit of Indiana. He served in
that capacity for three consecutive
terms. For several years he was
County Attorney of Pulaski County,
and City Attorney of Winamac.
In 1908, he was elected Judge of
the Forty-fourth Judicial Circuit, enjoying the unique distinction of being
the youngest circuit judge ever chosen in Indiana. Lack of space prevents any detail on the decisions of
Judge Vurpillat. Suffice to say that
many of them, such as the Kankakee
Meander Land Case and Proctor
Regulation Act Case, are landmarks
in Indiana law today.
From the bench, the Judge came
to Notre Dame where he has been
Dean of the Hoynes College of Law
since 1913. Under his administration, the Law School has grown
from a few rooms in the basement of
Sorin Hall to one of the best buildings on the campus.
In recognition of the invaluable
services which Judge Vurpillat has
rendered the University, the Class of
'22 met in November and gave him
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the highest honor within their power
-the Dome dedication.
A. H. H.

ored the Law School and by honoring the Hoynes' College of Law they
have honored themselves.
J. J. B.

DOME DEDICATION

It is with pride that the Law
School regards the action of the Senior Class in the dedication of "The
Dome." The seniors of 1922 decided
to give this singular honor to Judge
Francis J. Vurpillat, Dean of thej
Hoyne's College of Law. Judge Vurpillat has worked long and faithfully to build up the Law College. He
took control of the School after the
retirement of Colonel Hoynes and he
has made a wonderful success of the
task. It was mainly through the efforts of Dean Vurpillat that a separate building was turned over to the
Law School. The Jadge has worked
unceasingly to build up a good, practical library. Due to his initiative,
many new courses have been added
to the Law schedule. Judge Vurpillat has, by his faithful work and his
wonderful knowledge of the Law
been able to win the confidence and
respect of every student in the college. He has always treatedI his students as men and they in turn have
always acted like men. No man in
the Law College shrinks from encountering the Judge either as Dean
or as a friend. They know that they
will always receive the credit that is
due them or the discredit that they
may deserve. The Judge is bluff and
direct and he always does as he says.
His word is an assurance that a thing
will be done or will not be done. The
men respect him for this quality.
They love him as a friend; they respect him as a teacher; and they honor him as a Dean. It is therefore,
with pride that they regard the action of the Senior class. By honoring Judge Vurpillat with the Dome
dedication, the Senior Class has hon-

STUDENT GOVERNMENT

Student government has, for the
first time made its appearance at Notre Dame. Up to date, the Faculty
of the University has always maintained a strict paternal attitude in
this regard. The men have been regarded merely as children and frequently they' have acted like irresponsible youngsters. However, a
portion of the University is now going to enjoy self-government. The
moment is a critical one both for the
Faculty and for the students. The
Faculty must prepare for a good
many changes and it must stand
ready to give the men at the head of
the movement a free hand. The students must not be too hasty in condemning either the movement or the
men who have been elected to head
the movement. Hasty action on either side will ruin any chance that the
movement may have. Bad faith on
either side means failure. Each side
must be prepared to give up something. The Faculty must keep hands
off and give the governing board a
free hand. The students must learn
to stand behind the decisions of their
representatives and they must do all
in their power to promote the welfare of the new organization. It will
be a novel sight to watch the development of the student control movement. It means evolution. It means
that the student who has criticized so
long and so often is to be given a
chance to better conditions.
It
means that the responsibility for success or failure is in his hands. Student government is a horse that can
be ridden to death. However, we
hope that this will not be the case at
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Notre Dame. We hope that the students will have enough foresight to
see that they are the ones who receive the benefit. We hope that they
will be broad-minded enough to uphold the decisions of the court that
they have initiated. If the students
play fair and if the faculty plays
fair, the student government movement is bound to succeed. We honor
the men who have labored to bring
the movement into being at Notre
Dame and we wish each member of
the rules committee every success.
J. J. B.

the student of Law. Many interesting cases or questions are discussed
which aid the student in grasping the
Law. Besides being a help to the
student, the Law Reporter will also
benefit the Lawyer. Many of the
cases treated in the Moot Courts are
thoroughly developed and the citations are given. These will prove of
help to the Attorney who is often too
pushed for time to be able to look up
every question in which he is interested. Besides this, the Law Reporter serves to act as a link between the
Alumni and the Hoynes College of
Law. The columns of the Law ReVALUE OF REPORTER
porter are open alike to the Alumnus
We urge every Law student to sub- and the student. Take advantage of
scribe for the Law Reporter. This is this and use them. Subscribe to the
a paper for the Law students and it Law Reporter and help it in its strugJ. J: B.
is practical in every respect. The gle to benefit you.
Law Reporter reports every case that
WHY NOT THE LAW SCHOOL?
is filed in the courts of Notre Dame.
While Notre Dame is planning to
It serves to guide the student through
his court work and it is valuable re- build up its Commerce School and
view. The reporter serves to solidify its Engineering School, we believe
the work that proceeds so rapidly in that it should remember the Hoynes'
our courts. Many of the happenings College of Law. One of the high ofin Court are too swift to be grasped. ficials of the University once said
They can always be found in the Law that he regarded the Law school as
Reporter. The Law Reporter might the only Post Graduate school on the
well be said to do for the student campus. However, if the Law School
what the Case books do for the Law- is to continue to stand out like this,
yer. The Attorney can read a case it is necessary that it receive some
and get everything out of it. But of the benefit of the endowment. The
many of the minor steps are not re- Law School needs more professors
ported and are missed by the student. and it needs a bigger and more comIn the Law Reporter, these steps are plete library. The Law Library conalways to be found. The editors of tains the tools of the lawyer. The
the Law Reporter realize that the library room is his shop and the
student must know these steps if he books are his tools. To be successful,
is to be able to grasp intelligently the the lawyer must have tools that are
cases that he reads. Therefore, read apace with the times. The reporters
the Law Reporter and you will be must be up to date and the reference
better equiped to battle with the books must be the best obtainable. It
case books. Besides the cases report- is true that the Faculty of the Law
ed from the Moot Courts, there are school is a good one, but if it is to
articles in the Reporter of interest to give the best that it has, more pro-
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fessors must be secured. It is possible to kill a willing horse by running
it to death. If a few Professors are
forced to handle all of the classes
either they will become ill or else the
quality of their work must fall. Either of these things would be a disaster. Therefore, we believe that a
portion of the endowment fund
should be set aside to build up the

Law School. The Hoynes College of
Law has always been an honor to Notre Ddme and we believe that everything should be done to perpetuate
this fact. It is true that the Law
school is not the only one that needs
help, but we believe that while the
rush is on to help the other schools
the needs of the Law College should
J. J. B.
not be forgotten.

CLASS-ICKS
AN ARGUMENTATIVE GENERAL lawyer of South Bend was called to
the jail to counsel an imprisoned
DENIAL
client. After hearing the prisoner's
classpleading
his
to
The Judge
statement, he said, with a display of
furcase
following
The
Gentlemen:
nishes a good example of the argu- legal wrath, 'Why! they can't put
'Well, hyou in jail for that.'
mentative general denial:
here just
'I'm
client,
the
exclaimed
a
against
made
was
A complaint
the
same.'
the
had
bitten
Dutchman that his dog
Judge V. to the same class: 'Did the
complainant's child; to which the
tell you that as original?'
Judge
Dutchman answered:
the class in chorus.
answered
'Sure,'
In de first place, dat dog he don't
V., 'I've been perJudge
said
'Well,'
bite your child; in de second place,
my own for six
as
that
petrating
dat dog, he dont got no teeth; and in
expose the Judge,
now,
to
the third place dat dog he aint my years. And
and avoidconfession
plead
and
to
dog in the first place.
ON ONE COLONEL AND TWO
JUDGES
Judge F. to his class: "A young

LAW

ance for myself, and to give honor to
whom honor is due, I want to say that
that old nut was cracked by the Colonel thirty years ago.'

SCHOOL NEWS.

The Legal Recearch Training
Course.
There may be a bag of gold at the
end of the rainbow, but, generally
speaking, such is not the case at the
end of a law education. "Impecuniosity" and "young lawyer" have
practically become synonyms in our
language, and the more unkind writers constantly flaunt this fact before
the struggling young attorney.
The American Law Book Company
of Brooklyn, however, has taken a
very praiseworthy step to encourage

the budding barrister who will leave
'school in an impoverished condition.
'In brief, the move is this: Recognizing the fact that it is most important
to know where to find the law, the
Law Book Company has prepared
eight sets of questions, twenty questions to each set.
These questions are to be answered
by references to Cyc-Corpus Juris.
'The student is given a month in
which to answer each series. The
course is required of every Junior
'and Senior. To the one answering
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the entire one hundred sixty questions most correctly a set of CycCorpus Juris will be given as a prize.

and sincere handshake of Judge Vurpillat.

The year started off with remarkable punctuality. Even Doc Hughes
and Paul Schwertley were here a day
ahead of time, and Judge Farabaugh
told us that the sedate John Brady
was on the campus, September 1st.
It is hardly necessary to go further
after giving you the foregoing, almost incredible facts.

The faculty staff has been changed
somewhat. Prof. James B. Costello
has retired from teaching and returned to his home in Hazelton, Pa.,
where he is engaged in the general
practice of law. He carries with him
the best wishes of his former students.
Hon. Samuel Parker, A. B., of the
firm of Anderson, Parker, Crabill &
Crumpacker, South Bend, Ind., was
added to the staff, but certain unforeseen difficulties have prevented
his assuming active duties in the law
school this year.
Vitus G. Jones, Litt. B., LL. B.,
who was to teach the course in Abstracts, has had to undergo a serious
operation and will not be able to
teach before next year.
Arthur Hunter, Ph. B., LL. B., is
now teaching Criminal Law and Procedure.
Edwin Fredrickson, LL. B., has
been given the course in Contracts,
along with that of Partnership, and
Bills and Notes.
Judge Vurpillat is teaching a class
in Administrative Law. This is a
new course for the law college, and
one which many schools are giving
only in their post-graduate years.
Prof. John Tiernan has had his
first text published. It is Conflict of
Laws (Callaghan & Co., $2.00). Congratulations!

It was quite a trick to register this
year. There were no less than fiftyseven steps to go through, and the
more nervous of us suffered severe
breakdowns. The end of our enrollment journey, however, was worth
the terrifying preliminary procedure,
for there was the invincible smile

The Law Club re-organized early
in the year. Vincent Pater, '22, was
chosen president; Eddie Hogan, '23,
vice-president; John Heffernan, '22,
secretary, and Frank Donahue, '24,
treasurer. The contest between Ray
Kearns and Jim Murphy for sergeant-at-arms was most spirited.

It has been an exceptional year for
the University, and especially for the
Hoynes College of Law. Two years
ago or so, we read an article by Delmar Edmondson in the Reporter,
called Notre Dame's Legal Renaissance. It was an interesting,
well-written piece of work, and we
lawyers liked it because, in a way, it
Was a defense of our college. That
was when the status of the school
was questioned. We still like it, not
because of its eulogistic nature, but
Tather because it marks the beginning of the growth of the Law
School, which today is the largest on
the campus. We had a delightful admission of this last November when
the Law Club held its smoker. Father
Burns was the speaker of the evening, and when he saw the large
crowd, he showed genuine surprise
and asked the chairman whether all
those present were bona fide law
students.
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The final count resulted in a victory
for the lad from Bridgeport.
One big smoker was given in November. A feature of the affair was
that there was no assessment. Needless to say, the entire club was present. Many still talk about the delicious cider. Plans are now being laid
for the annual banquet.

Judge Carberry, who handle the appendages with the debonair grace of
a Chesterfield.

The Law Library has been increased by some very valuable additions. Among the new books which
have been placed on the shelves recently is a set of thirty volumes of
the American and English EnceyloA new addition to the Law School
pedia of Law, the gift of James P.
has been the librarian, Prof. Frank
Fogarty, LL.B., who has law offices
Whitman. Perhaps it is out of order
in the Finance Bldg., Philadelphia.
to give any compliments at such an
T. Paul McGannon, LL.B., 1907, is
eai'Iy date, but we sbadi say this: it is
the donor of 194 volumes of the New
a genuine pleasure to go into the LiYork state reports. Paul is at prebrary and note the order prevailing.
sent deputy attorney general of New
York.
"Gentlemen of the Law Club:
We have also received the Illinois
"The veneer of civilization is thin,
decisions, consisting of 130 volumes
and it is the primeval instinct of evSupreme Court, and 185 Appellate
ery man to carry a weapon." Thus
Court Reports, from the Hon. Chas.
began the sonorous speech of John
Craig, LL.D., of the Supreme Bench
Buckley, Ph.B., A.M., and embryonic
of that state.
LL.B. man, which resulted in the
It would be cheap for us to attempt
adoption of canes by the Senior lawto voice our gratitude for these gifts.
yers.
We can only say that we do not know
The custom of the lawyer's carryof a better way in which these men
ing a cane is one so old and venerable
could have helped the alma mater.
that the "memory of man runneth
not to the contrary ;" yes, even antedating Chinese civilization and going
While most of us on the campus
back to cave-man days when might were indulging in the excesses of a
was law and every man was his own free day, Nov. 11, 1921, Clarence
lawyer.
Manion packed his grip and journeyHomecoming Day, 1921, marked ed to Dyersville, Iowa, where he was
the formal appearance of the cane on the speaker of the Armistice Day
the campus and the making of com- Celebration. The affair was under
ments, pro and con, on the part of the auspices of the American Legion,
the other colleges. The canes have and rumors drifting "back home"
greatly increased the popularity of have it that our Kentucky classmate
many of the men. Especially, has acquitted himself in his usual wonthis been true of Chet Wynne and derful form.
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ALUMNI

DEPARTMENT

ARBITRATION AND THE LAW.
Leo J. Hassenauer, LL.B. '20.
The recent arbitration of Wages,
Working Agreements, and Rules submitted to Judge Kenesaw M. Landis
as Arbitrator by agreement between
the Building Contractors and the
Trades Council, has a tendency of
creating a precedent in settling wage
disputes. There are strong reasons
for believing that the United States
will see a great development in this
field in coming years. Few business
men, before the war, knew anything
about the matters of arbitration and
lawyers were skeptical of its merits.
The term "arbitration" suggested
red tape, haggling and compromising
and hence something very different
from justice, which knows nothing
of concessions and swaps. The public for the first time, does now begin
to realize that back of these arbitration proceedings there lay tremendous potentialities.
The common law was little concerned with the disputes of traders.
The organization of Courts Pepoudros or better known as "dusty foot"
courts took place during the time of
the Saxons and lasted until the nineteenth century in English market
towns. These were the merchants
courts. The proceedings were had
without delay and without etiquette
since the suitors proceeded from
their stalls into the hearing chamber, dusty booted and eager to settle
a dispute before their petition lost
their crackle. It was a long time before the technique of arbitration was
worked out to entire success.
The American Civil War, accord-

ing to a report of the Municipal
Court of Chicago, played a considerable role in developing the practice
of arbitration in Great Britain.
Numerous disputes arose between
foreign traders. These were worked
out under rules of arbitration so successfully that the practice was taken
up by other bodies. This form of
arbitration, however, has to do with
trade associations both domestic and
foreign and which are now encouraging the incorporation of clauses in
contracts to submit to arbitration
those disputes which might arise in
due course of dealing.
Difference between trade disputes
'and wage disputes.
The history of arbitration which
has been set out only minutely heretofore deals with those forms of
trade arbitrations settling disputes
of a commercial nature only. The submission to an arbitrator of those disputes arising out of wage and work:ing agreements is without precedent
in Chicago with the exception of the
case of Packers and Workers settled
before Judge Alschuler some few
years ago. The settlement of the
disputes presented to Judge Landis
in May, 1921, affords an opportunity
for arbitration laws of a national
character in which the public shall
be made a co-arbitrator. That the
settlement of disputes between employers and wage earners decided by
a man of such high legal attainments
as Judge Landis possesses, clearly
leads one to believe that the various
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clauses interpreted, carried a meaning attached to them of a legal nature.
The settlement of wage disputes
seems to have become a question of
Victory between opposing forces,
with the abolition of unions on the
one hand and maintaining the union
standard on the other as an incident
in the settlement. The public, as innocent bystander, is in the usual precarious position with a fair chance
of heading the casualty list. And
yet the public interest is of the greatest importance. Certainly there is
a crying need of a general understanding that co-operation, not conflict, is the only solution to such problems, in which the public is vitally
interested. I feel that the treatment
the public has had in the past warrants the most magnanimous consideration on the part of our legislative committees in Congress. To
maintain the high standard of living
to which the American people have
been raised, requires the whole-

NEWS

ABOUT

A CALL TO THE WILD.
The primary purpose of establishing this department was to publish
the various successes and activities
of old "Grads" at the Bar. The editors are more than desirous of receiving any and all information concerning the progress of past N. D.
Law Graduates, and they earnestly
solicit contributions for this section
from all those who fortunately possess interesting news of a Notre
Dame legal light.
Why should the glad tidings of an
alumnus' legal achievement be esoteric? So therefore, all ye loyal lawyers let your contributions be forthcoming.

hearted co-operation of government
and people, as well as a frank recognition on the part of employer and
worker of each others rights and duties.
That part of the public that has
been affected, I say, is neither discouraged nor disheartened.
The
business situation that is developing
is gradually arising above that which
was a product of the distorting influences born of war. The result of
the arbitration has been noted
throughout the country especially in
those districts wherein wage disputes
were becoming a national question.
The application of the award to those
differences arising between employer
and worker has proved to be of great
benefit and has assisted materially in
the building situation and only now
are we reaching the lower slopes
from which we can look down on the
valleys of stability and arriving at a
liew era of sound and enduring prosperity, of social order and happiness.

THE ALUMNI
HON. M. 0. BURNS, LL.B., '88.
Honorable Michael 0. Burns, of
Hamilton, Ohio, recently delivered a
marvelous speech at Newark on the
subject of "Old Age Pension Legislation." With a thundering appeal this
eminent Notre Dame Alumnus presented the question of Old Age Pension Laws and was frequently interrupted with great applause. He
vividly portrayed the necessity of
their adoption in this country and
showed how wonderfully well the
aged people of England, France and
Germany get along where old age
pensions have been established by appropriate legislation. He said that if
'old age pension laws are enacted in
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this country, then those old men and
women who daily go along the path
of life grinding out their lives, will
need have no fear of the "Poor
House" if they find themselves in
later years unable to work any longer
or provide the necessities of life.
At the .close of his oration, Hon.
Burns received an ovation that was
in itself the sincerest compliment.
He is of the old Law School back in
the glorious days of Colonel Hoyne
and old Sorin Hall, and undoubtedly
it will be interesting to many to know
that President Father Burns and
Hon. Burns were classmates while
attending Notre Dame years ago.
The powerful and convincing oratory of Hon. Burns is very renowned
throughout Southern Ohio, and this
together with his brilliant record at
the Bar has continually reflected immense credit on his old Alma Mater
-Notre Dame.
MR. LEO. HASSENAUER,
LL.B., '20.
Surely you all remember the energetic Leo, especially for his beloved
and glorious ideas concerning a real
Law Club Banquet. He told you frequently that Law had 'been always
his one and only hobby, and that he
fully intended to follow it. True to
his word, Leo, after receiving his
LL.B., in June, 1920, started to practice in Chicago, and the most recent
news of his progress which reached
the office of the Editor-in-chief stated
that he was admitted to Federal
Practice in Judge Landis' Court last
month.

likes it very well and we are not sure
whether he means "Broadway" or the
"Law." He is serving out his year
of clerkship which is necessary in
New York before an applicant is permitted to take the State Bar Examination. We have no doubt that Gerald will easily pass his Bar Examination at the expiration of his year, and
perhaps he will specialize in Corporate Law, the Law which he always mastered.
MR. WILLIAM S. ALLEN,
LL.B., '21.
In a letter from Mr. Allen we find
that he is connected with Pam &
Hurd in the Rookery, Chicago. He
refers to a statement made by Colonel Hoyne at the Law Club Banquet
held in Mishawaka '20, and says that
no truer words were ever spoken,
namely "That the Law is a jealous
mistress." Without a doubt Mr. Allen is right, for if one expects to
make a success out of the law he
simply must sooner or later marry
himself to it.

MR. FRANK J. MILESKI,
L.L.B., '20
Mr. Mileski tells us that he is practicing in the city of Milwaukee, and
that he had little trouble in passing
his state Bar Exam. with the sterling
inculcations received during his stay
at this Law School. Quoting from his
letter: "I have often heard the remark that the field of Law was overcrowded but through personal experience I find it very much to the
*
*
*:
contrary." Certainly this last observation of Mr. Mileski will be quite
MR. GERALD J. CRAUGH,
LL.B., '21.
encouraging to every young and
"Jerry" is now gracing the offices hopeful barrister hailing from any
of Grout & Grout in New York City part of Wisconsin, especially Milon Broadway. He tells us that he waukee.
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and began the practice of the GreatMR. GEORGE D. O'BRIEN
LL.B., '21
est of Games, LAW. His start at the
George was for some reason delay- very outset was spelt with success.
ed in taking his state Bar Exam. Just last November when the Tioga
with the rest of his class, but this County Court opened its new term
six month delay did not in the slight- there were four Criminal Cases
est discourage "Obie," and we have docketed for trial the first week, and
word before us that he very success- it was found that three of the four
fully passed the Illinois Bar last Dec- defendants had Francis Clohessy for
ember. While attending Notre Dame their counsel.
John Fitzgerald, a well known
he was famous for his clever caricatures and Juggler Jokes, and at pres- railroad man was tried first. He was
ent he is having this debate with him- held for having taken part in an auself: Shall I be a Lawyer or an Art- tomobile accident and driving away
first
without
ist?
Frankly, we believe "Obie" from the scene
name
and
address
leaving
his
should be both, for then he can alwith an officer or the injured party,
ways draw clients.
as required by law.
After submitting evidence for two days
MR. ANDREW L. McDONOUGH,
the State rested its case. Then our
LL.B., '19
yuong protege, Francis, in a short
We have before us the following argument before the Court contendcard from one of Notre Dame's finest ed that the State had conclusively
track heroes-Andrew L. McDon- shown that an automobile alleged to
ough and Andrew V. McDonough have been owned by Mr. Fitzgerald
announce their association in the had figured in the accident. But he
general practice of Law under the further said that no evidence had
firm name of "McDonough & Mc- been submitted by the State to show
Donough," with offices in the Bab- that the defendant was driving the
cock Building, Plainfield, New Jer- automobile or was occupying it at
sey, and in the Elizabeth Trust Build- the time of the accident. And on this
ing, Elizabeth, New Jersey. This he predicated his motion for a dissplendid combination of legal geni- missal of the case; that no evidence
uses will undoubtedly be greeted with had been introduced to show that
an array of legal victories in the John Fitzgerald had committed a
towns of Plainfield and Elizabeth, crime. After a 10 minute recess
for surely there is the law, and each Judge Andrews granted the defendvictory will be a victory for Notre ant's motion and dismissed the case.
Dame and her College of Law.
The dismissal of a Crimnial Action
in a County Court is very unusual in
MR. FRANCIS J. CLOHESSY,
the present day trials, and Mr. FitzLL.B., '19
gerald's quick discharge bespeaks a
Leaving Notre Dame after his brilliant victory for his attorney
graduation Francis J. immediately Francis J. Clohessy, one of Notre
located himself in Waverly, N. York Dame's very finest legal products.
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THE CLASS OF '21 AT THE BAR -

THEIR LETTERS

The letter of Charles P. J. Mooney, tober Bar Examination held in
published in the June issue of the Springfield, Illniois, a telegram was
Law Reporter, had informed us of directed to the Dean of the School
his splendid success. The following of Law, which reads in substance as
is from the letter of Charles P. J. follows: (telegram not at hand.)
Illinois members of the Class of
Mooney, senior, father of the Charles
'21 made five touchdowns at the bar
of the Class of '21:
examination just held at Springfield.
Memphis, Tenn, Aug. 9, 1921 Henry W. Fritz, Edmund J. MaegMy dear Judge Vurpillat:
her, William S. Allen, Alden J. CusOut of a group of 114 candidates ick and George Witteried. ConCharles' general average in the bar gratulations due on account of our
examination was the highest. This good course in law at Notre Dame.
word from the Secretary. The Sec- (Signed)
HENRY W. FRITZ
retary told Captain Fauntleroy, my
A letter since received from Lawassistant, that while in some sub- yer Fritz informs us that he is aljects a few graded a little higher than ready actively engaged in the pracCharles, he went uniformly high in
tice and he relates his first case exall subjects and seemed to have a perience
(and promises to do better
thorough understanding of the subnext time).
jects. The candidates were from the
We have letters from all these Illeading universities outside and inlinois Boys except George Witteried,
side the State.
who has visited us since his successI am writing this as a note of apful passing of the bar, and told us of
preciation to you and the other memhis intentions to "get going soon."
bers of the Law Faculty.
Charles is on the paper. He must
We have a very beautiful personal
wait till the County Court meets to
letter from William S. Allen, writget a formal character certificate.
ten from 858, The Rookery, Chicago.
My thanks to you, and best wishes.
At the outset he issues a peremptory
Yours truly,
writ of mandamus against its pubC. P. J. MooNEY
lication. But we must remind him
We are justly proud of the record that for every reasonable exercise of
Charles has made and of the expres- the polive power the good citizen
sion of appreciation coming from his must sustain his loss cheerfully and
father, who is a man of high stand- without legal compensation. In the
ing in public life in the South, and is interest of the. public welfare therean editor of The Commercial Appeal fore we shall proceed to publish in
of Memphis, Tennessee. We have the Law Reporter what is deemed
been recently informed that Charles printable. He says:
P. J. Mooney, '21, has taken a place Dear Judge Vurpillat:
in a firm of noted corporation law"I want this to be a personal letyers of Memphis.
ter to you, so please do not put it in
the Law Reporter. I want to tell you
Immediately following the an- that I am grateful beyond words to
nouncement of the results of the Oc- you for your instruction and for your
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many courtesies and favors to me.
"Five members of the Class of
1921 passed he Illinois Bar examination held in Springfield in October.
The exam. was a typical Illinois Bar
examination. I think you can deduce
about what it was like. We shall
take the attorney's oath before the
Supreme Court of Illinois at Springfield next Thursday. We are the
first class to go in under the new
amendment to the rules of the Supreme Court which requires the application to appear in person before
the court to take the oath and receive
his license.
I am working or the firm of Pam
& Hurd in the Rookery. I always have
been an enthusiast for the law and
still like it. The firm is a good one
and they do more office work
than court work.
I firmly believe
what Col. Hyones told us at the Law
Banquet in 1920-that "The Law is a
jealous mistress". No truer words
were ever spoken.
I happened to be in Judge Landis'
courtroom the other morning and saw
Leo Hassenauer (Class of '20) admitted to Federal practice.
I want to thank you again for putting me through the Illinois Bar exam., and also hope you will remember
me to the Law Faculty and my other
friends at school.
Very Sincerely Yours,
WILLIAM

S.

ALLEN

We fully appreciate the fine sentiment of Mr. Allen's letter, so characteristic of him. All at Notre Dame
well know his excellent record for
scholarship and deportment and
unanimously assure him of immediate
and continued success in the service
of the beautiful though "jealous
mistress."

The following enthusiastic letter
from Chicago speaks for itself concerning one of N. D.'s most favorably known scholars:
Dear Judge Vurpillat:
On Tuesday and Wednesday of
last week I took the Illinois Bar Examination at Springfield. And yesterday I learned that I was succesful.
Almost needless to say, my good
fortune confirms in my mind what I
have several times said to you and
often said to others, namely, that
Notre Dame law is as good as Harvard law or Columbia law or Georgetown law-as good as the law of any
university in the land. Had I failed
in my first tussle with the Board of
Examiners, neither the Law School
nor yourself and able staff would
have shared the blame. My high
opinion of Notre Dame would have
remained unchanged. But having
succeeded, I feel appreciative to you
and your associates to a degree
which is beyond expression. Please
convey this thought to all members
of the law faculty whose united efforts have made my good fortune
possible. With me, your stock and
theirs will sell par every day in the
year.
Of course I will be down for the
Nebraska game. At that time I will
see you and Professors Tiernan,
Farabaugh, Frederickson and Costello to personally convey my gratitude. Until then, believe me to be
Very truly yours,
ALDEN J. CUSICK
Mr. Cusick expects to apply his
splendid legal talents along special
lines of endeavor. He launched his
work as a representative of the
Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance
Company of Milwaukee. He has tak-
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en a position recently with the great
advertising concern, Thos. J. Cusack
Company. Mr. Cusickl's splendid
ability will assure his success anywhere.

From 4830 Indiana Ave., Chicago,
comes the following letter:
Dear Judge:

The letter was too slow for the
good news in the following case, so
came this telegram: "Rochelle, Ill.,
Dec. 15, 1921. (To the Dean) Thanks
to you and all the rest. I passed the
State Bar Examination. Your system
is great.
GEORGE D. O'BRIEN."
George did not complete the required time of resident study until
the close of Summer School and
therefore did not take the Illinois
Bar Examination with the June
members of his class. George makes
the sixth of the Class of '21 to pass
the Illinois Bar. In a letter previous
to the examination he expressed the
hope that he might honor the Law
School by passing, and also gave high
praise and credit to the school and its
course.

Just a line to let ou know that I
was successful in the October Bar
X. I am pleased to take this opportunity of extending my gratitude to
yourself and the other members of
of the Law Faculty for the excellent
course that I received at N. D.
The exam was comprised almost
exclusively of Constitutional law,
Three of the Indiana members of
Evidence, Property, Wills, Conflict
of Laws, Equity and Common Law the Class of '21 have passed the rePleading. I feel that my success in quired examination and been admitthe exam. was due primarily to a ted to the St. Joseph County Bar Asgood course in Pleading and Conflict sociation, and are engaged in the
of Laws, as about twenty-five of the practice of law in South Bend. Frank
questions were on these two subjects. Coughlin was recently appointed
With best wishes for a successful Deputy Prosecuting Attorney. Walter A. Rice and Harry Richwine,
year, I remain
while practicing law in South Bend,
Very truly yours,
are also pursuing their studies in
the Law School for the master's deEDMUND J. MEAGHER
gree.
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DIRECTORY
Of the Notre Dame Law Alumni
In Forwarding Business to a Distant Point Remember Your
Fellow Alumni Appearing in This List.
ARIZONA
TusconJames V. Robins,
107 Melrose St.
ARKANSAS
Little RockAristo Brizzolara,
217 E. Sixth St.
CALIFORNIA
Los AngelesTerence Cocgrove,
1131 Title Insurance Bldg.
John G. Mott, of
Mott & Cross,
Citizens National Bank Bldg.
Michael J. McGarry,
530 Higgins Bldg.
Leo B. Ward,
4421 Willowbrook Ave.
San FranciscoAlphonsus Heer,
1601 Sacramento St.
COLORADO
Telluride.James Hanlon
CONNECTICUT
BridgeportDonato Lepore,
645 E. Washington Ave.
Raymond W. Murray,
784 Noble Ave.
HartfordJames Curry and Thos. Curry, of
Curry & Curry,
D'Esops Bldg., 647 Main St.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
WashingtonTimothy Ansberry,
208-12 Southern Bldg.
GEORGIA
AtlantaFay Wood,
225 E. Fourth St.
ILLINOIS
AuroraRobert Milroy,
113 Fox St.
BataviaJoseph Feldott
BelvidereStephen F. McGonigle,
1011 Whitney St.

BuddArthur B. Hughes
CampusFrancis T. Walsh
ChicagoFrancis O'Shaughenessy,
10 S. LaSalle St.
Hugh O'Neill,
Conway Bldg.
Charles W. Bachman,
836 W. Fifty-fourth St.
John Jos. Cook,
3171 Hudson Ave.
James V. Cunningham,
1610 Conway Bldg.
Hugh J. Daly,
614 Woodland Park
Leo J. Hassenauer,
1916 Harris Trust Bldg.
William C. Henry,
7451 Buell Ave.
John S. Hummer,
710-69 W. Washington St.
Albert M. Kelly,
2200 Fullerton Ave.
Daniel L. Madden,
Conway Building
Clement C. Mitchell,
69 W. Washington St.
William J. McGrath,
648 N. Carpenter St.
Thos. J. McManus,
5719 Michigan Ave.
John F. O'Connell,
155 N. Clark St.
Joseph P. O'Hara,
1060 The Rookery
Clifford O'Sullivan,
2500 E. Eeventy-fourth St.
Stephen F. Reardon,
405 Peoples Life Bldg.
Francis X. Rydzewskl,
8300 Burley Ave.
Delbert D. Smith,
3966 Lake Park Ave.
Fred L. Steers,
1350 First National Bank Bldg.
Max St. George,
108 S. LaSalle St.
DecaturWilliam P. Downey,
110 N. Water St.
DixonJohn Sherwood Dixon,
East OttowaHarry F. Kelly, of
Kelly & Kelly,
Eastwood
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East St. LouisJoseph B. McGlynn and Daniel McGlynn,
of McGlynn& McGlynn,
120 N. Main St.
ElginThos. J. Hoban,
16 Chicago St.
Frank A. McCarthy,
18-14 Elgin National Bank Bldg.
Lawrence McNerney,
Home Bank Bldg.
William Perce,
Opera House Bldg.
Elmer Tobin,
18 Chicago St.
GalesburgHon. Charles Craig
HoopestonGeorge E. Harbert,
827 E. Penn St.
HowardPaul J. Donovan
KewaneeThomas J. Welch,
Savings Bank Bldg.
LedaDaniel P. Keegan
MendotaJohn W. Dubbs,
Washington St.
MalinePeter Meersman,
205 Reliance Bldg.
Matthew McEniry,
408 Peoples Bank Bldg.
Mt. CarmelMartin E. Walter,
119 W. Seventh St.
(Ottowa-Robert C. Carr, of
Johnson & Carr,
Central Life Bldg.
John E. Cassidy,
322 E. Superior St.
James J. Conway,
406-7 Moloney Bldg.
Daniel C. Curtis,
519 Guthrie St.
Thomas O'Meara,
Route 27
Thomas O'Meara,
406-7 iMoloney Bldg.
PeoriaGeorge Sprenger,
Jefferson Bldg.
PoloRobert Bracken
RobinsonWilliam E. Bradbury,
RochelleThomas F. Healy
First National Bank Bldg.

Rock IslandFrancis A. Andrews,
631 Fifth St.
SpringfieldThomas Masters
Albert C. Schliff,
918 N. Sixth St.
StreatorElmer J. Mohan,
Route No. 3
WoodstockPaul Donovan,
Hoy Block
INDIANA
AndersonEdward C. McMahon,
2004 Fletcher St.
Philip O'Neill,
511-13-15 Union Bldg.
Crawfordsville-Justin J. Molony,
706 Binford St.
ElkhartJames S. Dodge,
229-31 Monger Bldg.
Wilmer O'Brien,
325-6 Monger Bldg.
Robert Proctor,
201-5 Monger Bldg.
East ChicagoHugh E. Carroll
Fort WayneWilliam P. Breen, of
Breen & Morris,
Peoples Trust Bldg.
Joseph Haley,
202 Shoaff Bldg.
Cornelius B. Hayes,
New Hayes Hotel
Thomas A. Hayes,
501 Bass Block
Frank M. Hogan, of
Colerick & Hogan,
Cor. Court and Berry Sts.
Emmett A. Rohyans,
2725 S. Calhoun St.
Lawrence Stephan,
1431 Hugh St.
FrankfortEarl F. Gruber,
Dinwidie Bldg.
GaryHenry B. Snyder and Patrick Maloney,
of Snyder & Maloney,
738 Broadway
IndianapolisJames E. Deeky,
316-324 Law Bldg.
Paul J. Smith,
2024 Central Ave.
KokomoGeorge F. Windoffer,
324 W. Jefferson St.
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LafayetteFrancis J. Murphy,
430 S. Third St.
Chas. E. and Vincent Vaughan, of
Vaughan & Vaughan,
710-711 Lafayette Bldg.
John W. Eggeman,
800 N. Fourth St.
LaGrangeGeorge D. McDonald,
114 Sixth Ave.
LintonHugh E. Carroll
MarionFred B. Mahaffey,
622 S. Brownson St.
Michigan CityLorenzo Glascott,
223 W. Tenth St.
James Kenefick,
Care T. M. J. and J. P. Kenefick
Louis Finski
MishawakaRalph Feig,
Mishawaka Trust Bldg.
John Schindler,
215 S. Main St.
MontgomeryBernard Heffernan,
Route 4
McCordsvilleHarry Kelly
William H. Kelly
South BendLeo J. Cook,
410 Union Trust Bldg.
G. A. Farabaugh and
E. A. Fredrickson,
504 J. M. S. Bldg.
Samuel Feiwell,
404 Citizens Bank Bldg.
Charles Hagerty,
J. M. S. Bldg.
Vernon R. Helman,
R. F. D. 5, Box 18
Patrick Houlihan,
203 Title Bldg.
Arthur B. Hunter,
710 Portage Ave.
Floyd Pellison,
334-36 Farmers Trust Bldg.
Joseph J. Kovacs,
109 N. College St.
Arthur May,
811 J. M. S. Bldg.
Ernest Morris,
Farmers Trust Bldg.
Thomas D. Mott,
522 Farmers Trust Bldg.
William Mclnerny,
104 Summers Bldg.
William B. O'Neill,
406 Citizens Bank Bldg.

John E. Peak,
224-26 Farmers Trust Bldg.
George W. Sands,
211-12 Convervative Life Bldg.
Armand Schellinger,
415-16 Union Trust Bldg.
George Schock
Samuel Schwartz,
706 J. M. S. Bldg.
Edwin H. Sommerer,
125 N. Francis St.
Vincennes-Louis H. Hellert,
American Bank Bldg.
IOWA
CarrollJoseph J. Meyers,
201 Masonic Temple
Des MoinesWilliam J. Hynes,
504 Observatory Bldg.
DubuquePatrick J. Nelson,
200-6 Security Bldg.
Fort DodgeMichael F. Healy,
605-10 Snell Bldg.
Emmet P. Mulholland, and
Clement B. Mulholland,
300 Snell Bldg.
Ida GroveMatthew M. White
Iowa CityJohn J. Ney
LenoxEugene F. McEniry
Mason CityJohn D. Wilson
MuscatineRichard B. Swift,
504 Laurel Bldg.
NewtonRalph Bergman
PrestonHarry Godes
WaverlyHumphrey L. Leslie,
204 S.State St.

KANSAS
Kansas CityRussell C. Hardy,
812 N. Fifth St.
Thomas V. Holland,
1623 Central Ave.
Theodore J. Lyons,
716 Pyle St.
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KENTUCKY
LebanonSamuel J. Spaulding,
Box 585
Samuel T. Spaulding
OwensboroAlbert Oberst,
Masonic Bldg.
LOUISIANA
New OrleansPatrick E. Burke,
307 Camp
Thomas V. Craven,
305 Wells Fargo Bldg.
MASSACHUSETTS
BostonWilliam P. Higgins,
730 Tremont Bldg.
SpringfieldWilliam J. Granfield
Court Square, Theatre Bldg.
MICHIGAN
DetroitHarry Cullen,
1226-30 Dime Bank Bldg.
Daniel Foley,
1626 Penobscot
Thomas A. McLaughlin,
76 Belmont Ave.
Louis C. Wurzer and F. Henry Wurzer,
Wurzer & Wurzer,
910 Majestic Bldg.
FlintVincent D. Ryan,
910 Flint P. Smith Bldg.
Grand RapidsJoseph Riley,
236 Valley Ave., N. W.
JacksonJames G. Henley,
117 W. Pearl
LansingMaurice D. Kirby,
310 Bauch Bldg.
MINNESOTA
CrookstonEdmund E. Sylvester,
124 State St.
Joseph H. Sylvester,
124 State St.
DuluthThomas McKeon,
817 Torrey Bldg.
MinneapolisEdward F. Barrett,
1774 Gerard Ave., S.
St. CloudGeorge L. Murphy,
340 Seventh Ave., S.

31ISSOURI
Kansas CityLeonard M. Carroll,
3117 Flora Ave.
Drexel L. Duffy,
201 Linwood Blvd.
Llewellyn D. James,
323 W. Armour Blvd.
John R. Meyers,
310 Ridge Bldg.
St. LouisJohn L. Corley,
Fullerton Bldg.
MONTANA
Butte-Timothy Downey,
21 Center St.
Frank C. Walker,
825 W. Quartz St.
John Ward,
28 E. Quartz St.
GalenAlbert Galen,
Galen Block
MaltaWilliam McGarry
NEBRASKA
WahooFrank Kirchman,
Box 337
NEVADA
Elko-Edmund Carville,
Farrington Bldg.
RenoMichael Diskin
NEW JERSEY
PlainfieldAndrew L. McDonough,
Babcock Bldg.
RockawayDaniel P. Murphy,
Wriebands Corporation
NEW MEXICO
Las VegasThomas V. Truder,
East Las Vegas
NEW YORK
AlbanyT. Paul McGannon,
Care Office Attorney-General
Buffalo-Max G. Kazus,
459 Amherst St.
GenevaFrancis T. McGrain,
9 State St.
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.AhesterDaniel J. Quinlan,
47 Exchange St.
New York CitySimeon Flanagan,
Care John J. Sullivan,
203 Broadway
Peter McElligott,
428 W. Twenty-fourth St.
PalmyraHarold P. Burke
WaverlyFrancis J. Clohessy,
455 Fulton St.
NORTH DAKOTA
MinotGeorge McGee
Park RiverJacob V. Birder
RugbyThomas Toner,
Main St.

OHIO
AkronClarence May,
427 Second National Bank Bldg.
Walter McCourt,
365 S. Mlain St.
CincinnatiErnest DuBrue,
835 Beecher Ave.
Cleveland1852 Ansell Road
Stanley B. Cofall,
Harry Miller,
Grasselli Chemical Co.
Walter Miller,
318 Leader News Bldg.
James O'Hara,
303 Park Bldg.
Hugh O'Neill,
1934 Euclid Ave.
ColumbusDonald Hamilton,
801-8 Huntington Bank Bldg.
DaytonThomas Ford,
127 Maple St.
Joseph B. Murphy,
618 Dayton Savings & Trust Bldg.
John C. Shea,
Schwind Bldg.
HamiltonMichael O'Burns,
338 S. Second St.
LancasterMichael A. Dougherty,
343 E. Walnut
Harry P. Nester,
156 E. Chestnut St.

LimaFrancis W. Durbin,
607 Law Bldg.
MaumeePeter M. Ragan
NapoleonEdwin C. Donnelly,
827 Haley Ave.
SanduskyEdmund Savord,
Room 3, Sloan Block
ToledoRobert Dederich,
2619 Scottwood
Albert J. Kranz,
116 Nicholas Bldg.
Edwin J. Lynch,
642 Nicholas Bldg.
James T. McMahon,
2916 Collingwood Ave.
John B. McMahon,
940 Spitzer Bldg.
Arthur W. Ryan,
366 W. Central Ave.
OKLAHOMA
TulsaHarold R. Delaney,
1412 S. Boulder St.
Leo Holland
Patrick M. Malloy,
1115 Denver St., P. 0. Box 1957
OREGON
AstoriaJames L. Hope,
312-15 Spexarth Bldg.
IndependenceFrancis W. Kirkdand
PortlandRoscoe Hurst,
1406 Yeon Bldg.
Frank Lonergan,
816 Electric Bldg.
Roger Sinnott,
Chamber of Commerce
WoodburnStephen Scollard
PENNSYLVANIA
HomesteadJohn J. Brislan,
400 McClure St.
JeanetteJohn W. Ely,
601 Germania Bank Bldg.
JohnstownJohn C. Larkin,
322 Wood Ave.
PhiladelphiaJames P. Fogarty,
1607-08 Finance Bldg.
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Edward Gallagher,
301 E. Lehigh Ave.
George Hanhauser,
401 Market St.
PittsburghDaniel C. Dillon,
811 Frick Bldg.
RydalEdward Britt
SOUTH DAKOTA
ChamberlainNicholas Furlong
EdgemontWilliam A. Guilfoyle
HowardTheodore Feyder
TENNESSEE
Memphis-.
Charles McCauley,
383 N. Second St.
TEXAS
BeaumontHarry P. Barry,
Stark Bldg.
SintonBryan Odem,
Sinton State Bank
James F. Odem
WASHINGTON
CentraliaWilliam Cameron,
304 W. Plum St.
WISCONSIN
FennimoreRalph J. Lathrop
George F. Frantz, of
Clementson & Frantz,
Gravenbrock Bldg.
Green BayJohn Diener,
Room 1, Parmentier Bldg.
MilwaukeeFrank Burke,
904 Pabst Bldg.

Joseph E. Dorais,
Belvidere Apt., 58
Thomas C. Kelly,
66 Eighth St.
Chgauncey Yockey,
514 Wells Bldg.
Edward Yockey,
Merchants & Farmers Bank Bldg.
NeelsvilleGeorge A. Frantz
PlymouthGilbert P. Hand,
105 Milwaukee St.
RacineGrover F. Miller,
1116 College Ave.
SpartaJohn P. Doyle,
508 S. Water St.
SuperiorSherman May,
2016 Hammond St.
CUBA
CeinfuegosAndrew Castille,
Box 505
MEXICO
Mexico CityAlfonso Anaya,
Qa, Apartado 52
PHILIPPINE ISLAND8
Beinaton UnionBernardo Lopez
ManilaJose Manuel Gonzales
Turlac, TarlacJose Urquico
Misamia ProvinceEmilio Aranus
SorsogenDoroteo Amador

